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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current doctrine, applied 
effectively, is more than adequate to the task of providing military planners the 
flexibility needed to develop plans and prosecute campaigns in the Low Intensity 
Conflict/Small Scale Contingency (LIC/SSC) arena. 
Most of the writing about the supposed inefficacy of our present doctrine 
deals with the structure, and "mind-set" of the military establishment. Suggested 
solutions presently range from fixing the problem through scaling down 
conventional units (currently reflected in the push for the medium brigade), to 
arguments made for flattening the present command infrastructure and adopting 
new doctrines made possible through the development of information warfare 
(IW) assets, capabilities, and technology. 
We argue in this thesis that the problem, however, is not with the doctrine, 
but with its application. The change of mind we advocate would have the Army 
learn how to accomplish its tasks by applying the same tools but in a different 
way. We believe that the key to properly utilizing present doctrine lies in a three- 
fold solution incorporating information management, education, and training. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that current doctrine, applied 
effectively, is more than adequate to the task of providing military planners the 
flexibility needed to develop plans and prosecute campaigns in the Low Intensity 
Conflict/Small Scale Contingency (LIC/SSC) arena. We chose this arena 
because the preponderance of United States involvement in the foreseeable 
future will be in this venue: one in which accomplishing objectives does not 
include defeating an army in the field. The occasions when we can use "blunt 
force" will be fewer than those in which we will enter a permissive or semi- 
permissive environment to accomplish national goals/objectives - where force is 
an adjunct rather than a mainstay. It is in these situations that a greater degree 
of political awareness and cultural sensitivity is required, especially since force 
has the potential to be counter productive to our goals in the long run. 
While the concepts in this thesis are applicable for the military planner at 
any level, the target audience includes those planners at the Battalion or Brigade 
level. By virtue of the LIC/SSC environment, planners at this level are now 
compelled to take a broader view of the situation at hand. Indeed, the levels at 
which they operate are exactly where the first cracks in the operational edifice 
will appear, where seemingly innocuous local actions can produce far reaching 
unintended national and international consequences. Also, by virtue of being on 
the ground, planners at Battalion and Brigade levels are in a position to 
understand local problems and the complexities they create better than are those 
who would offer a solution from afar. 
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At the same time, as imperative as it is to be sensitive to the political side 
of an operation and gain as thorough an understanding of policy makers' 
objectives as possible, it is even more critical to understand how one's actions 
may influence the operation. In his seminal work on political versus military 
control in ongoing operations, COL (Ret) Lloyd Matthews makes the salient point 
that 
...the first and foremost requirement for the soldier, if he is ever to 
achieve operational autonomy, is to convince his political masters 
that he understands the political aims behind the contemplated 
military action and that he will conduct the military action in a 
manner calculated to achieve those aims. (Matthews, 1998, p. 26) 
Matthews cites numerous examples of National Command Authority (NCA) 
involvement with tactical and operational issues, brought about oftentimes 
because the "political masters" (p. 24) are not comfortable that the commander 
on the ground is either tuned into the "political realities" (p. 24), or, that he or she 
will take those realities into consideration when developing operations and 
contingency plans. With this requirement in mind, military planners, and 
commanders at all levels need to understand the constraints that LIC and/or SSC 
impose. 
The fact that we, as soldiers, have to get it right with regard to plans that 
meet the policy makers'/NCA's intent while still accomplishing the mission 
creates inherent tensions. Dr. David Tucker (Tucker, 2001) noted during a 
lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School that diplomats frequently tend to dislike 
military involvement in the planning process because once members of the 
military get involved they begin making plans, which then, more often than not, 
become etched in stone, and thus limit to some extent the flexibility that the State 
Department would prefer. Additionally, military intervention is but one way to 
react to a situation. Whereas diplomacy, when it is effective, is open-ended and 
continuous, military operations have definite start points and, with any luck, 
defined end points. Putting together a coherent military plan in a political 
environment where, as Robert McNamara quipped at the end of the Cuban 
missile crisis, "There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis 
management" (Matthews, 1998, p. 20), demands the ability to effectively tie 
military planning and action to political and diplomatic machinations and retain 
the flexibility to tailor the military response appropriately to maintain that tie with 
ongoing political and diplomatic efforts. Nothing is more important. 
Equally essential as sensitivity to, and an understanding of, the political 
situation, is sensitivity to and an understanding of the culture and psychology of 
all players in the theater of operations: including allies, various private volunteer 
organizations (PVOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the 
population of the target country. In situations where we have either been invited 
in, or have invited ourselves in, and the situation is either permissive or semi- 
permissive - in other words, where our aims are to be gained primarily through 
diplomacy and by convincing the population that what we want for them is in their 
own best interests, as opposed to coercive diplomacy at the point of a gun - 
factoring cultural and societal considerations into the military decision making 
process (MDMP) is absolutely critical.    When these considerations are not 
factored in, or when the wrong conclusions are drawn, the operation fails 
absolutely. 
II. THE SITUATION 
Given a set of tools, one can make a variety of different shapes; the same 
principle applies to the MDMP. The MDMP used improperly will turn out only one 
size and shape of an item. Then, when that "item" does not fit the requirement, 
the complaints begin: "our present doctrine does not work in SSC", "we should 
change our doctrine", or one hears the alternative accusation that "we are being 
hamstrung by our doctrine." Yet, in such circumstances, it is the carpenter who 
is to blame, not the tool kit. Much as it is a piss-poor carpenter who blames his 
tools, it is a piss-poor planner who blames "doctrine" for operational 
shortcomings. As this thesis sets out to prove, the doctrinal tool kit is sufficient if 
properly and skillfully used. The MDMP allows planners to take into account 
societal variables no matter the cultural environment in which they find 
themselves, and to tailor a military approach that fits the situation through a 
thorough understanding of the local conditions. 
A.     IDENTIFYING THE NEED 
Like it or not, the military does not have the exclusive mission of fighting 
wars. These days there is an ever greater tendency toward peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, and SSC, as well as LIC. Weaponry under development 
includes non-lethal arms to a degree not previously seen. For better or worse 
the military, as the de facto leader or the initial planning agency for operations 
that, although they may start with the military, end up as civic action, has a 
responsibility to ensure that it does not make the follow-on job of other agencies 
more difficult by failing to use foresight as it develops its plans. 
The objective of a campaign plan is to "provide unified focus and clear 
direction for military operations, and to link those military operations to the other 
elements  of national power:  diplomacy,   economic  tools,   and information 
management' (Ballard, 1998, p. 64) (italics the authors').  If the campaign plans 
or the operation plans (OPLANs) do not address the "national" objectives, but 
instead simply offer the exit strategy for the military as a separate entity, then not 
only has the military made the job of follow-on agencies more difficult, but it could 
add to the time that the United States is involved: hence, it could be responsible 
for the overall failure of the mission, as in the case of Somalia.  As the lead-off 
agency with a limited role in the overall mission, but whose initial actions color 
the rest of the mission, the military has a responsibility to ensure that its initial 
actions and plans do in fact form a "link...to the other elements of national power: 
diplomacy, economic tools, and information management" (p. 64). 
The "off-the-shelf operations plans (OPLANs) all focus on the purely 
military side of a conventional war, with good reason.    Many of the factors 
important to fighting and winning a war change very little, if at all, over time. 
However, in a LIC/SSC scenario, the importance of factors other than military 
increases by orders of magnitude and must be developed with the same 
attention to detail paid military factors in any conventional OPLAN.    This 
understanding  of the   180-degree  difference  between  the  prosecution  of 
conventional war and LIC/SSC is established loud and clear in the report from 
the Center for Naval Analyses' (CNA) 1995 conference: 
...the military is frequently placed in situations where warfighting 
will not accomplish the mission. And military leaders often find that 
the real requirements of the operation differ from those of their 
mission. (McGrady & Smith, 1998, p. 5) 
This hints at a messy real world, in which one must deal with the situation 
as it exists, like it or not.  It is possible, in fact probable, to win the war but lose 
the peace if military planners do not see past their, noses, and past the most 
expedient means of meeting tactical or operational requirements, to take into 
account the possible long-term impacts of their actions, and plan accordingly. 
For instance, in Albania in 1998 a Battalion Commander gave an order to remove 
trees that were interfering with his fields of fire, an order that was complied with. 
Chainsaws were brought out and the offending trees were felled. The backlash 
from this action was immediate and damaging to the conduct of the mission. The 
commander had conveyed to his people previously that he considered himself 
and his battalion to be "at war".  Was the United States at war?  Were not the 
Americans in fact guests of the country? The issue was less that the trees were 
removed and more that no apparent thought was given to determining an 
alternative solution.   Given the commander's skewed vision of his purpose for 
being in the country, the trees were in the way; the trees were cut down. 
Clearing fields of fire is unquestionably a commander's prerogative and is, in fact, 
his or her responsibility, if this is what is called for by the tactical situation. 
However, in the context of the situation at the time in Albania, such a move was 
deemed gratuitous by the Battalion Commander's higher command, and rightly 
so. 
B.       DEVELOPING A TURN OF MIND 
The imperative for always having an exit strategy emerged as a result of 
our experiences in Vietnam, and was subsequently codified in the Weinberger 
doctrine.  We in the military generally like this; it keeps things neat, rather black 
and white.  We know what our mission is when we go in (the start point).  We 
know what we're going to do, and in what order (the phases of the operation). 
And we know when to stop fighting and go home (the end point), so we like to try 
to sequence our response. However, in doing so we conveniently fool ourselves 
into regarding the military's mission as a separate phase, and ignoring the fact 
that it is tied to others' efforts.   This causes us to use words and phrases like 
"termination" and "end state" and "exit strategy" - all implying and conveying to 
those who use and hear such terms the impression that there is a clean end to 
our involvement when, in fact, there is not. There is no "end." What there is is a 
transition from mostly-military operations to diplomatic operations. 
Clausewitz described war as diplomacy via other means. But as he would 
be the first to point out, war is still diplomacy. The term "coercive diplomacy" 
addresses precisely this point: that force, or the threatened use of force, must be 
considered adjunct to, not in lieu of, continued diplomatic efforts to resolve a 
situation. Since what the military in effect does is jump into the middle (both in a 
temporal and linear sense) of an on-going diplomatic operation, we in the military 
have a responsibility to ensure that the planning that we do for our portion of the 
overall operation - the restoration and continuation of diplomacy - is compatible 
with on-going and future diplomatic efforts.   When we do not incorporate our 
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portion of the mission into the broader diplomatic objective, we oftentimes create 
additional problems. 
Most of the writing about the supposed inefficacy of our present doctrine 
deals with the structure, and "mind-set" of the military establishment. Suggested 
solutions presently range from fixing the problem through scaling down 
conventional units (currently reflected in the push for the medium brigade), to 
arguments made for flattening the present command infrastructure and adopting 
new doctrines under the rubric of "swarming" (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2000), made 
possible through the development of information warfare (IW) assets, 
capabilities, and technology. The counter-arguments for each of these, 
meanwhile, are as well thought out as are the arguments for them. 
In contrast, the change of mind we advocate in this thesis, would have the 
Army learn how to accomplish its same tasks by applying the same tools but in a 
different way. Our doctrine - and the MDMP - is sufficient. The principles that 
Clausewitz espoused in the 1800's are timeless, fundamental and, as such, are 
as valid today as they were when he espoused them. It is how those principles 
are applied which has changed - and arguably should change with the times and 
technology. For instance, mass as applied to IW may mean simultaneous 
computer attacks against the Schwerpunkt, as opposed to a company of light 
infantry massing for an attack. 
But in addition to changes in our capabilities, there have been, and will 
continue to be, changes in both our adversaries and their tactics. Modern day 
"guerrillas" have benefited greatly from the inception of the internet, as evidenced 
by the Zapatisas who kept "the Mexican government and army on the defensive 
for several years by means of aggressive but peaceful information operations" 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p. 2).  Moreover, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt point out, 
the Zapatistas in no way have a corner on the market: 
...networked nonstate actors, particularly those associated with a 
nascent global civil society, may raise political and social 
challenges and opportunities that differ radically from those we 
have traditionally confronted, or desired. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, 
p. 3) 
Thus, as we reexamine the military's role in LIC/SSC - or more 
accurately, how the military views its role - we come to the second reason we 
advocate a change of mind For instance, although Figure 1 (seen below) is 
meant to reflect the "Range of [potential] Military Operations." 






























Strikes and raids 
Peace enforcement 









The states of peacetime, conflict, and war could all exist at once in the theater commander's strategic environment. He can respond to 
requirements with a wide range of military operations. Noncombat operations might occur during war, just as some operations other that war 
might reuire combat. 
Figure 2-1. Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment 
Figure 1. "Range of Military Operations". From Ref. FM 100-5 
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this title is misleading in a subtle, yet extremely important way. "Military 
Operations" conveys the message that the military is "in charge" - and that it is 
the entity running the show and setting the conditions. In fact, it would be more 
accurate to describe military involvement in the operations listed under 
"Peacetime Examples" (counterdrug, etc.) as "Operations in Which the Military 
May Play a Part", with heavy emphasis on the word "part." In operations such as 
these the military is working with someone, for someone, and therefore must 
ensure that it is meeting the "commander's intent" of the agency which does have 
the lead. Far too often the military adopts the approach of, "you called for us, 
now get out of the way and let us do our job", rather than, "you called for us, what 
is it that you want us to help you to accomplish?" 
The turn of mind that must be developed involves a broadening of the 
analytical horizons beyond the convention of set-piece battles, with their numbers 
of soldiers, tanks, and planes all neatly tied together by the attrition coefficients of 
the Lanchester Combat Model. We believe this necessitates a reconsideration of 
the proper usage of the MDMP. The focus of the next chapter is on using the 
MDMP in LIC/SSC scenarios. 
11 
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III. THE MDMP AND CURRENT DOCTRINE 
The MDMP "drives" the application of doctrine - problems transpire when 
the reverse occurs.   By design, current doctrine is sufficiently structured and 
flexible enough to allow planners to formulate solutions to any problem (mission, 
operation, battle, campaign) at hand, as this excerpt from the opening paragraph 
of FM 100-5 demonstrates: 
As an authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitive enough to 
guide specific operations, yet remain adaptable enough to address 
diverse and varied situations worldwide" (FM 100-5,1993, p. 1-1). 
Formulating solutions for LIC/SSC or peace operations is unique and, in 
many ways,  more challenging than  determining  solutions for conventional 
operations.    FM 100-23, Peace Operations (1994) reinforces this point as it 
states: 
The complex environment, changing circumstances, and 
multinational and political dynamics of peace operations complicate 
planning. The planning process itself is the same as for other types 
of operations, but considerations and emphasis may be different, 
(p. 3-1) 
This chapter will identify the unique planning considerations for the 
LIC/SSC environment by discussing the unique LIC/SSC planning considerations 
as they apply to the seven steps of the MDMP. The chapter assumes the reader 
is familiar with the MDMP as outlined in FM 101-5, Staff Organization and 
Operations (1997), and illustrated on the following page.   The intent of this 
chapter is not to provide an explanation of the seven steps of the MDMP and 
each of the step's components. Rather, the chapter uses the framework of the 
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INPUT 
-Mission received from 
higher HQ or deduced by 




-Facts and Assumptions 
-Restated mission 
-Car's guidance / intent 











STEPS OF THE MDMP 
RECEIPT OF MISSION: 
MDMP begins with the receipt 
of or anticipation of a new 
mission - order can be issued 
from higher or derived from 
an ongoing operation. 
MISSION ANALYSIS: 
The problem is defined and 
the process for determining 
feasible solutions beains. 
COA DEVELOPMENT: 
Specific methods for solving 
the problem are generated. 
COA ANALYSIS: 
Methods are war-gamed or 
analyzed to determine their 
ability to solve the problem. 
COA COMPARISON: 
COAs are compared to 
determine which COA most 
efficiently solves the Droblem. 
COA APPROVAL: 
The commander chooses, 
refines or modifies, or rejects 
the DroDosed COAs. 
ORDERS PRODUCTION: 
The COA is developed into a 
complete OPORD or OPLAN 
Figure 5-3. Staff inputs and outputs 
+ Denotes commander's responsibility 
OUTPUT 
-Car's initial guidance 
-Warning Order 1 
-Initial IPB products 
-Restated Mission 
-Initial Cd^s Intent / 
Guidance / CCIR 
-Warning Order 2 
-Staff products 
-Preliminary movement 




-Missions to subordinate 
units 
-Refined Cdr"s intent / 
guidance / CCIR 
-Decision Matrix 
♦Approved COA 
+Refined Cdr's intent 
♦Specified type of order 
and rehearsal 
+High pay-off target list 
+OPORD / OPLAN 
Figure 2: The Framework of the MDMP. After Ref. FM 101-5 
MDMP as a means to discuss the unique planning considerations and highlight 
areas  that  may  require  additional   or  different  emphases  in  a  LIC/SSC 
environment if one hopes to prepare a viable plan or solution. 
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A.       STEP 1 OF THE MDMP: RECEIPT OF MISSION 
Time management is critical in any military operation, but perhaps most 
critical in the LIC/SSC environment. LIC/SSC operations are more likely to have 
a diverse task organization than more conventional operations, including in their 
composition PVOs, NGOs, coalition partners (to include NATO and UN forces), 
and inter-agency elements. These organizations cannot, nor should they be 
expected to, plan, prepare, and execute at the same pace as the United States 
military. 
Effectively integrating non-military organizations into the MDMP through 
parallel planning can compensate for some of the differences in planning and 
preparation capabilities: 
Warning orders facilitate parallel planning. Parallel planning 
means that several echelons will be working on their MDMP 
concurrently. This is essential to speed up the process for 
subordinate units and allow subordinates the maximum time to 
conduct their own planning. Parallel planning relies on accurate 
and timely warning orders and a full sharing of information between 
echelons as it becomes available. Parallel planning is a routine 
procedure for the MDMP. (FM 101-5, 1997, p. 5-5) 
While the US military is good at parallel planning in-house, to be as 
effective as it can  be in the LIC/SSC environment it must include other 
organizations in the process.   Including the appropriate people and agencies 
concurrently, or jointly, in the planning process can only help with the follow-on 
steps of the MDMP - giving military planners insight into the areas that are 
typically dismissed or ignored, but that can, and should, be integrated into 
mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, analysis, comparison, 
and the subsequent orders production process. 
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B.       STEP 2 OF THE MDMP: MISSION ANALYSIS 
1.        Mission 
The failure to understand/integrate intent, a concept of operations, and the 
mission of the commander two levels higher into the analysis and solution 
process leads to the failure to understand specified tasks, a failure to identify 
implied tasks, and the inability to comprehend constraints - all of which result in 
deriving an inaccurate restated mission. 
The above phenomenon causes problems in any type of operation, but it 
can have a compounding effect in LIC/SSC operations. Without a clearly stated 
and understood strategic intent, concept of operations, and mission, the ability to 
synchronize the efforts of numerous diverse organizations at the operational and 
tactical levels becomes exceedingly difficult, as described in FM 100-23, Peace 
Operations: 
Transitions may involve the transfers of certain responsibilities to 
nonmilitary civil agencies. NGOs and PVOs may be responsible for 
the ultimate success of the peace operation, perhaps with 
significant US support, to include military forces. Transitions in 
peace operations may have no clear division between combat and 
peacetime activities, they may lack timetables for transferring 
responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political 
environment, (p. 3-3) 
If planners do not clearly understand the higher command's intent, concept of 
operation, and mission, as well as the roles various military and non-military 
organizations will play in the upcoming operation, the remainder of the planning 
process is prone to failure. 
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The   LIC/SSC  operation  conducted   in  Somalia  illustrates  this  well. 
President Bush described the initial US mission (Operation Restore Hope) in the 
following way: 
Our mission has a limited objective - to open the supply routes, to 
get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. 
peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open- 
ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary. 
(Carpenter, 1992) 
Were the mission and intent clearly understood? Were the actions of all military 
and non-military participants clearly tied to accomplishing the mission and intent? 
Did the "division between combat and peacetime activities" cause problems in 
Somalia?   Was the Somalia operation "conducted in a fluid, [and] increasingly 
political environment?" We believe the answers to these questions highlight the 
importance mission factors hold for generating effective planning in the LIC/SSC 
environment. 
2.        Enemy 
a.       Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) 
A failure to fully understand factors such as tradition, culture, 
hierarchy, and societal control processes or mechanisms during mission analysis 
directly contributes to a failure to adequately understand the enemy's current 
activities, which in turn can lead to an inability to predict the enemy's reactions 
during COA development and analysis.   Doctrine recognizes the importance of 
understanding an adversary's cultural and traditional differences as FM 100-5 
states: 
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Understanding cultural differences is important if friendly forces are 
to establish the military conditions necessary to achieve strategic 
goals. (FM 100-5, 1993, p. 1-1) 
But while doctrine recognizes the importance that cross-cultural understanding 
plays in accomplishing strategic objectives, cultural differences are not always 
considered, or taken into account during the planning process. The problem is 
not the "framework" - the IPB remains a suitable framework for facilitating 
integration of cultural differences into the LIC/SSC planning process, as we will 
see - the problem is emphasizing the relevant LIC / SSC points within the 
framework. The following discussion of the four steps of the IPB illustrates some 
of the points that should be emphasized to properly integrate cultural differences 
into the planning process. 
b. Step 1 of the IPB: Define the Battlefield Environment. 
Defining the battlefield environment— the area of operations (AO) 
and the area of influence (Al) — requires a more expansive analysis, or 
emphasis, for LIC/SSC operations than for more conventional operations. In 
LIC/SSC operations analysts cannot limit intelligence requirements (IR) in their 
assigned AO to the adversary's "uniformed military",. or to aspects of the 
infrastructure that hold "traditional" military utility only. Accounting for the 
"uniformed military" within the AO allows analysts to begin to understand their 
environment, but analysts will never fully comprehend the LIC/SSC environment 
unless they expand their IR to what some might consider "non-military" issues. 
For example, defining a  LIC/SSC environment thoroughly will 
include gaining an understanding of such things as traditional infrastructures and 
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sources of power, ethnic backgrounds, religious beliefs, political loyalties, 
transportation networks, food distribution methods, and economic practices or 
exchange relationships, to name but a few (FM 100-23, p. 4-6). 
Understanding the area of influence (Al) in the LIC/SSC 
environment also encompasses understanding more expansive, and quite often 
more complex, sets of issues. An AO is something that is assigned or stated by 
a higher headquarters, so an AO has discernable boundaries. By definition, an 
Al has no prescribed boundaries, as it is the area outside of an AO that may 
affect the upcoming operation. The areas or topics that require special or 
additional emphasis for understanding the battlefield environment make the 
implications of understanding the Al especially important in the LIC/SSC 
environment. 
At the strategic level, areas of operation will likely reflect, or 
somehow coincide with, the borders of independent countries. This can pose a 
problem for planners as they attempt to determine the Al in the LIC/SSC 
battlefield environment. Ethnic heritage and allegiances, traditional 
infrastructures, and religious beliefs are just a few of the areas requiring special 
emphasis in the LIC/SSC environment because these are hardly restricted by, 
and often transcend, national borders. 
c.       Step 2 of the IPB: Describe the Battlefield's Effects 
Understanding the effects of terrain is a must to adequately 
describe the effects of the battlefield. Terrain analysis in the LIC/SSC 
environment must encompass more than the traditional military aspects of 
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terrain: obstacles, avenues of approach, key terrain, observation and fields of 
fire, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). To fully understand the battlefield 
effects one must think in terms of the socio-cultural terrain as well. 
To describe the battlefield effects in the LIC/SSC setting, planners 
must anticipate how such factors as ethnic allegiances, religious groups, and 
traditional practices may affect or play a role in the LIC/SSC operation at hand. 
In  conventional  military operations  planners  use  mobility  combined  arms 
operations overlays (MCOO) to visually display the role terrain has in describing 
the battlefield effects.   In the same way that a MCOO can help describe the 
battlefield effects in a conventional operation, demographic overlays can help 
describe the expanded or different battlefield effects in the LIC/SSC setting. 
Visually depicting ethnic ties and heritages, political affiliations, or the spread of 
communities is not an easy task, but must be done - and done accurately. 
Without an understanding of people's political, religious, ethnic and linguistic 
associations on the ground, it becomes increasingly difficult to understand the 
role that they may play in compounding or helping resolve the problem at hand. 
Without this understanding, the likelihood of accurately "Evaluating the Threat" 
and "Determining Threat COAs" is significantly reduced. 
d.       Step 3 of the IPB: Evaluate the Threat 
Planners   must   evaluate   the   "traditional"   military   threat   in 
conjunction  with  their expanded  examination  of the  environment and the 
battlefield effects if they hope to obtain a realistic evaluation of the threat in the 
LIC/SSC setting. 
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If the battlefield environment is properly defined during Step 1 of 
the IPB, planners should have a realistic assessment of the adversary's 
organizational and operating principles. In Step 2 of the IPB, planners should 
have gained an understanding of how these organizational and operating 
principles may affect the operation. When evaluating the threat, planners should 
begin to conceptualize the ways in which the adversary's organizational and 
operating procedures may be used as capabilities for countering the given 
mission and intent of the LIC/SSC operation. 
When the above process is employed to evaluate the threat in 
LIC/SSC operations, the nature of asymmetric warfare becomes apparent.  How 
does a conventionally weaker power respond to a conventionally stronger 
power?    Part of the answer lies in the weaker power's organizational and 
operating procedures that allow it to respond to the given situation. An adversary 
in the LIC/SSC setting will attempt to use his traditional organization and 
operating procedures to compensate for his conventional military shortcomings. 
Chapter 3 will show how Mohammad  Farrah Aidid successfully used and 
employed this methodology against the United States in Somalia. 
e.        Step 4 of the IPB: Determine Threat COAs 
When planners begin to determine threat COAs, the focus changes 
from "capabilities" themselves, to the employment of those capabilities relative to 
a friendly COA. Since threat COAs and friendly COAs are interactive in nature it 
makes little sense to discuss them as separate entities. For further discussion of 
threat COAs, see Step 3 of the MDMP: COA Development. 
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3. Troops 
In a LIC/SSC environment it is imperative to branch out from the purely 
"green-suiter" mentality of troop analysis, and analyze the status, capabilities, 
limitations, and deployment capabilities of the myriad players involved. The 
reasons for doing this early in the mission analysis will be addressed in some 
detail in the Haiti case study. 
4. Time 
As specific responsibilities and tasks become designated, the time 
required to complete them must be factored into the equation as well. However, 
it is paramount to realize that "time" is not written in stone, and the time estimates 
for the accomplishment of various tasks may be modified as a more complete 
picture of the situation is developed. While this places a premium on flexibility for 
the planning staff, the consequences of not remaining flexible regarding time 
estimates can cause significant problems further into the execution of the 
mission. 
5. Restated Mission 
While it should be obvious that the restated mission must support the 
intent, concept, and mission of the commander two levels higher, this is often a 
problem. Crafting a restated mission - a complicated process in conventional 
operations - is made exponentially more complex in the fluid environment that 
characterizes LIC/SSC operations given the need to ensure that the restated 
missions of the diverse players involved are mutually supporting. 
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Throughout the planning process and execution of LIC/SSC operations, 
the missions of the various and diverse organizations must be constantly 
assessed and reassessed to ensure they remain nested within the commander's 
intent. The need for continuous reassessment is particularly crucial for the units 
operating at the operational and tactical levels of war. Leaders at these levels 
often have a better appreciation of the true situation "on the ground". With this 
better understanding of "ground truth", operational and tactical leaders may find 
that, in the course of reassessing their missions, their efforts are counter- 
productive or not fulfilling the commander's intent via the most efficient means. 
6.        Determining   the   initial   Commander's   Critical   Information 
Requirements (CCIR) 
CCIR are developed in the mission analysis and should be refined and 
revised as the MDMP, and the subsequent operation, is conducted. This is 
arguably even more important in LIC/SSC than in conventional operations due to 
the natural evolution of the physical environment in terms of battle space, the 
force structure and aims of the players within that space, and the political 
situation (the latter affecting both the former and, potentially, the mission itself). 
For these reasons planners may not have the proper insight or knowledge to 
determine viable CCIR during the planning or initial execution phases of LIC/SSC 
operations. Therefore, it should be recognized at the outset that future 
adjustments may need to be made. CCIR are categorized as Priority Intelligence 
Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), or 
Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR). 
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7.       Determining the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) 
PIR are one of the most analytically helpful tools of the MDMP, while at 
the same time it is perhaps the most ineffectively used. This is particularly ironic 
in an age of increased information technology, where many of the very things 
that LIC/SSC planners may want to know - regarding local culture, social 
relations, etc., are out there '"for the taking" - not only from CIA fact book 
websites, etc., but from websites set up by people in the target country writing 
about themselves. In cases where planners begin the MDMP with a baseline 
knowledge of the information available, PIR could better fulfill its intended 
purpose for LIC/SSC operations. 
A working definition of PIR is, "what I need to know about the enemy to 
win or accomplish my own mission, as well as the higher(s) intent and concept of 
operations". If PIR is the information the commander needs to know to "win", PIR 
should logically be crafted with as much specificity as possible. The paradox is 
that planners often begin to craft PIR without a baseline understanding of the 
given LIC / SSC environment, causing an intelligence gap within the MDMP. 
PIR should drive the reconnaissance and collection process. When 
planners do not have a baseline understanding of the operational environment, 
they often establish PIR that are too vague, misguided, or unfocused to produce 
the type of information needed to facilitate developing a viable COA for the 
mission at hand. Vague, misguided, or unfocused PIR will eventually lead 
planners to a baseline understanding of the given environment, but this is often 
too late, as the intelligence gap already exists. If the resolution of the information 
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needed to win is low or non-existent when COA development begins, the 
likelihood of developing a viable COA that leads to accomplishing the mission 
and intent is also low or non-existent. 
PIR must be viewed with a different emphasis or "turn of mind" in the 
LIC/SSC environment. For instance, if the end state of a LIC or SSC operation is 
to restore democracy (as was the case in Haiti) or to create a viable 
infrastructure, PIR should be crafted to reflect this end-state. In a LIC/SSC 
setting, PIR may be necessary to determine the vulnerabilities of the adversary's 
military capabilities, but these types of PIR can only indirectly lead the planner to 
the desired end-state. It is a sine non qua to establish PIR that are directly 
related to the mission's end-state. 
Nor is PIR the sole domain of the military when the required end state 
requires a combined effort from several organizations, as is invariably the case in 
LIC/SSC. For example, training an effective police force in Haiti was important 
for restoring democracy and creating a viable Haitian infrastructure. Therefore, 
logic dictates that the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) - the United States agency responsible for vetting, training, 
and certifying the Haitian police force - should have played a role in PIR 
development. To effectively train the Haitian police force to conduct its intended 
mission, a baseline understanding of the history and utilization of Haitian Police 
should have been thought necessary before starting the reconnaissance and 
collection process. The fact that, "...the first graduating class of the police 
academy in 1931 produced every Haitian dictator up until the election of Aristide" 
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(McGrady, 1998, p. 34), is information that is "out there for the taking" and a 
prime example of the type of information required for LIC/SSC operations. 
Based on this knowledge, a PIR for ICITAP would be a compilation of 
personality/psychological profiles of past graduates in an effort to prevent 
problems. 
To use PIR for all it can be used for in the LIC/SSC environment, we must 
improve our baseline understanding of the environment first, before beginning to 
develop PIR, and there are several ways to do this. "Information management" is 
one way to improve this baseline understanding. As noted earlier, much of what 
is needed to begin to develop sound PIR is out there; the problem is often 
collating the information so it can be effectively used and integrated into the 
MDMP in a timely fashion. Another way to improve the baseline understanding is 
to ask or involve somebody in the planning who "knows". There are numerous 
people in a wide range of professional disciplines who spend a "lifetime" studying 
and writing on issues that often reflect the same information needed to develop 
viable PIR for LIC / SSC operations. 
While tapping these people may seem like the proverbial "blinding flash of 
the obvious", it is more often the case that such people are not asked - or 
requests are actively stymied, as was the case with Dr. Bryant Freeman, a widely 
recognized Haitian expert and a professor at the University of Kansas. LTC 
Anderson, then the J-3 civil affairs officer for Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 
attempted numerous times to have Dr. Freeman brought on the staff, only to be 
rebuffed at every turn (Kretchic, 129).   Dr. Freeman was eventually brought on 
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board in the face of stiff opposition, and subsequently "served as an adviser to 
Major General Joseph Kinzer", the UN Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) commander 
(Kretchic, p.141). 
8.       Determining the Essential Elements of Friendly Information 
(EEFI) 
EEFI is the "Information needed to protect friendly forces from the 
enemy's information-gathering systems" (FM 101-5, 1997, pp. 5-8). The growing 
reliance by the United States military on information technologies inherently puts 
a technological spin on this, often causing it to be viewed with an eye toward 
protecting a database or a command net architecture. In LIC/SSC, however, it 
may be more important to know the local allegiances, alliances, and ethnic 
groups than to protect communications architecture. Knowing whom you can 
trust may be the first and most important step for protecting friendly information 
from the enemy's information-gathering efforts in the LIC / SSC environment. 
In the case of Somalia, the question of which clans (or, in fact, which 
coalition members), were likely to support Aidid is an example of EEFI. In Haiti, 
EEFI was which elites were supporting the military? Knowing this type of 
information is critical to safeguarding planned actions, especially since our 
adversaries often do not have the technological capabilities to penetrate our 
information technologies in the first place. 
The United States military's fascination with the electronic spectrum, with 
regard to safeguarding EEFI, could cause an asymmetric relationship in the 
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LIC/SSC environment - one wherein the adversary is gaining information by low- 
tech means while we are focused on high-tech protection. 
9.       Determining the Friendly Forces Information Requirements 
(FFIR) 
FFIR is defined as information about the capabilities of one's own units or 
elements working in concert in the LIC/SSC operation. FFIR plays a crucial part 
in successful mission accomplishment. Understanding the myriad players and 
their capabilities, as well as their shortcomings, requires a "bottom up review" 
before one can hope to understand how they may positively contribute to the 
mission at hand. A less-than-complete understanding of the former may very 
well lead to assigning taskings to organizations ill-equipped to accomplish them, 
or to establishing unrealistic timelines for their accomplishment. 
When thinking of FFIR, one should not limit this construct to merely 
knowledge of units' or organizations' capabilities. To use FFIR effectively, 
commanders must know the units' or organizations' status in relationship to tasks 
they are executing. For instance, could the status of the Haitian police-training 
program, or the degree to which the Haitian judicial system was reformed, affect 
or modify the timetable or procedure for a hand-over from the United States to 
the UNMIH? FFIR, if well designed, can help the commander know how the 
force is progressing or not progressing toward the desired end-state. In the 
LIC/SSC environment, it is unlikely that the end-state will be clear-cut or easily 
recognized.  If properly structured, FFIR can help the commander to know if he 
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has accomplished his higher(s) mission, intent, and concept of operation. Part of 
winning or losing is knowing whether one has done one or the other. 
10.     Develop the Initial Commander's Intent 
The commander's intent is a clear, concise statement of what the 
force must do to succeed with respect to the enemy and the terrain 
and to the desired end state. It provides the link between the 
mission and the concept of operations by stating the key tasks that, 
along with the mission are the basis for subordinates to exercise 
initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise... (FM 101-5,1997, 
pp. 5-9) 
From this it is clear that a full understanding of the commander's intent is 
crucial for the development of plans and their execution in any environment. 
However, this is even more important in LIC/SSC because there are typically 
fewer levels of command between the policy-makers and the executors.   Even 
with advances in communications and technology, there is a higher likelihood 
that in the LIC/SSC environment lower-level echelons of command will take 
action independently, and that.unforeseen circumstances will surface abruptly 
which may directly affect the success or failure of the operation overall.   In the 
absence of specific guidance, a thorough understanding of the commander's 
intent and the key tasks of the mission enables the subordinate commanders to 
pick a course of action that fulfills the commander's intent. 
Key tasks are not tied to a specific course of action, rather they 
identify that which is fundamental to the force's success. ... The 
commander's intent does not include the "method" by which the 
force will get from its current state to the end state. The method is 
the concept of operations (FM 101-5,1997, pp. 5-9). 
The point that cannot be overstated here is that policy makers must play a 
lead role in developing the commander's intent for LIC/SSC operations.   Who 
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else, besides policy makers, can adequately describe what the end state should 
look like? The relationship of LIC/SSC to policy is much closer than is the case 
when conventional operations are being conducted.  Commonly in the LIC/SSC 
environment direct diplomatic efforts remain ongoing, and the military course of 
action must remain closely tied to those efforts.  During conventional operations 
direct diplomatic efforts have generally ceased, and the ultimate goal of the 
operation is to bring the adversary back to the table under favorable terms. This 
being the case, the commander in chief (CINC) and/or the commander of the 
joint task force (CJTF) should ensure each subordinate command understands 
the commander's intent (the commander in this case being the NCA). They also 
must remember they have a professional obligation to question the commander's 
intent when it is not clear (or militarily viable). 
C.       STEP 3 OF THE MDMP: COA DEVELOPMENT 
Once the commander's intent is communicated, then supporting COAs to 
fulfill it can be developed. Key to the COA development process is the 
understanding that each COA developed is a method to accomplish the 
commander's intent. While there can be an infinite number of methods, there is 
only one commander's intent. 
FM 101-5 lists six guidelines and steps to develop COAs (pp. 5-12 to 5- 
14). Figure 3, shown on the following page, provides a short description of the 
steps for developing COAs. While each of the six steps is relevant and valid for 
30 
Guidelines and Steps to Develop COAs 
Steps Description 
1. Analyze Relative Combat Power If Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB have not led 
planners to an accurate assessment of the enemy 
and the operational environment at hand, the 
likelihood of conducting a valid RCPA is 
substantially decreased. 
2. Generate Options Without a valid RCPA, there is little likelihood of 
establishing "what you must do to win" or 
accomplish the commander's intent. Planners 
must generate solution options in relationship to 
likely threat COAs (Step 4 of the IPB). Generating 
solution options without a valid or accurate 
understanding of the threat's potential response 
can lead to a COA that facilitates the threat's 
ability to employ his capabilities in an asymmetric 
manner. 
3. Array Initial Forces Planners must determine the appropriate type and 
size offeree needed to accomplish the mission 
and tasks at hand. Understanding the capabilities 
and limitations of the non-military organizations 
inherently involved in LIC / SSC operations will 
help planners begin to organize the appropriate 
size and type of force for the given tasks at hand. 
4. Develop Scheme of Maneuver Appropriately arraying the initial forces allows 
planners to begin to understand how the force 
must work as a collective element to accomplish 
the commander's intent. Visualizing the force as a 
collective element also facilitates establishing the 
control measures required to synchronize the 
individual efforts of separate units or organizations. 
5. Assign Headquarters Seeing how the force must work as a collective 
whole to accomplish the commander's intent 
provides planners the insight required to assign 
headquarters and task organize. Task organizing 
without an understanding of the interdependency 
of units' or organizations' roles in fulfilling the 
commander's intent can lead to unclear or 
unsound command and support relationships. 
6. Prepare COA Statements and Sketches Available planning time dictates the detail to be 
included in a COA statement, but at a minimum 
the COA statement should describe the role each 
of the independent headquarters will play in the 
operation. The COA statement should clearly 
show how each of the independent headquarters, 
and the forces task organized under them, provide 
mutual support in accomplishing the commander's 
intent. 
Figure 3: Guidelines and Steps to COA Development. After Ref. FM 101-5 
developing LIC/SSC COAs, for our purposes here only three of the steps require 
a unique or substantially different emphasis for LIC/SSC operations. These 
steps are Analyze Relative Combat Power (RCPA), Generate Options, and 
Assign Headquarters. 
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1.       Analyzing Relative Combat Power (RCPA) 
The purpose of RCPA is to enable planners to visualize friendlies' 
strengths and weaknesses in relationship to the enemy's strengths and 
weaknesses. A successful RCPA is one that provides planners a means to 
successfully accomplish the commander's intent in the most efficient and cost 
effective manner. The intent is to pit the friendly forces' strengths against the 
enemy's weaknesses. 
Conducting an RCPA sounds easy enough - it only makes common 
sense to plan a COA so that friendly strengths are capitalized, while the enemy 
strengths are exploited in relationship to the intent and mission of the given 
operation. However, although it "makes common sense", this is nearly 
impossible to accomplish without a "common" or a "baseline" knowledge of the 
enemy. 
If planners fail during Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB, the likelihood of 
conducting a valid RCPA is significantly diminished. Without an accurate and 
valid understanding of the enemy's organizational and operating principles (Step 
1 of IPB), one cannot see or understand how enemy forces may affect the issue 
at hand (Step 2 of IPB), which in turn leads to a failure to understand or identify 
the enemy's capabilities for countering the friendly forces' intent and mission 
(Step 3 of IPB). 
The risk that planners incur by conducting an RCPA without valid or 
sufficient information from Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB lies in inadvertently 
producing the very conditions they are hoping to avoid. If planners do not know 
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or understand that an adversary has asymmetric capabilities or options, and what 
those are, they will likely arrive at false conclusions during the RCPA. Believing 
you are capitalizing on strength, when in reality you are providing an adversary 
the opportunity to utilize unknown or misunderstood capabilities, represents the 
essence of asymmetric warfare. 
To avoid the pitfalls of asymmetric warfare in LIC/SSC operations, 
planners must not only have the knowledge that IPB Steps 1 through 3 should 
provide, but must also understand that the adversary is simultaneously 
conducting his own RCPA. To complete a successful RCPA, planners must 
visualize the enemy's RCPA as they conduct their own. By doing this, planners 
can take the first step to limit an adversary's ability to effectively employ an 
asymmetric strategy. 
2.       Generating Options 
Generating Options is perhaps the most important step of COA 
development. During this step, planners determine the single most important 
thing they must do to successfully accomplish the commander's intent and 
complete their mission (often referred to as the decisive point). In this respect 
LIC/SSC operations are no different than any other military operations. What a 
force must do to "win" must be established. Once established, purposes and 
tasks of separate units must be mutually supporting to facilitate "winning", or 
accomplishing the commander's intent. 
The successful execution of Steps 1 through 3 of the IPB and the RCPA 
set the conditions for planners to generate viable options for accomplishing the 
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commander's intent and the mission at hand. As planners begin to generate 
specific options (or COAs) to fulfill the commander's intent, they must do so 
bearing Step 4 of the IPB and PIR in mind. 
When developing specific COA options, planners are no longer analyzing 
general strengths and weaknesses, as in the RCPA, but are formulating a 
specific method, or COA, to accomplish the commander's intent. As planners 
generate the option or COA they must revisit or refine Step 4 of the IPB 
(Determine Threat COAs). Developing friendly COAs while considering the 
enemy's likely responses is a hard analytical task to get right in any environment, 
but hardest, arguably, in LIC/SSC. 
It is harder in LIC/SSC operations to visualize an adversary's potential 
response or COA in relationship to one's own COA for many of the reasons 
discussed in the IPB section.  Typically, planners do not know, or do not place 
the right emphasis on, the types of information needed to fully know and 
understand their adversary.    Even when planners have access to, and an 
understanding of, the right type of information about their adversary, knowing the 
details or specifics of how their adversary might respond to a given COA is 
difficult to anticipate.    This level of difficulty reinforces the importance of 
identifying and establishing the correct PIR in the LIC/SSC environment.   As 
planners  develop  COAs,  they  should   refine  their  PIR  to  reflect specific 
information requirements they need to know if the COA is to be successful.  For 
any COA to succeed, planners must continually reassess "what they need to 
know to win" as they are contemplating the COA they plan to use to win. 
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The discussion thus far - in terms of conducting the RCPA and generating 
options in conjunction with the products of Steps 1 through 4 of the IPB - is not 
offered as a "recipe" for success when developing COAs for the LIC/SSC 
environment. It is proffered, rather, to point out stumbling blocks when 
developing COAs that may facilitate an adversary's ability to utilize his 
asymmetric capabilities to his advantage. 
3.       Assigning Headquarters 
One of the principles of war - any kind of war - is unity of command. A 
clear delineation and a firm grasp by all involved of command and support 
relationships in LIC/SSC are particularly important, and more difficult to get 
straight due to the sheer number and diversity of agencies potentially involved. 
For PVOs, NGOs, and government agencies that do not operate under the 
military umbrella there has to be a single point of contact on the military side of 
the house with whom they can communicate their needs and concerns, as well 
as receive and understand the military's point of view, if coordination and 
cooperation are to reach their full potential. Communication must be two-way, 
and the most efficient way to achieve this is to and from a single source. 
D.       STEP 4 OF THE MDMP: COA ANALYSIS OR WARGAMING 
Each COA is analyzed or war-gamed after it is completed to determine 
how efficiently it accomplishes the mission and intent of the operation. War- 
gaming is a valuable tool for ensuring a COA is complete, and for ensuring that 
all synchronization and coordination factors are accounted for within a given 
COA. 
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However, the results of war-gaming can give planners a false sense of 
security in the COA if the enemy is misunderstood or misrepresented during the 
gaming process. If a COA proceeds through the war-gaming process and the 
"intelligence gap" discussed earlier exists, the COA may open the door (rather 
than slamming the door shut), enabling the adversary to employ an asymmetric 
response. 
Ideally, by the war-gaming phase, the intelligence gap has closed, and 
these conditions do not exist. If this is in fact the case, planners can start to 
receive, or become more knowledgeable about, their PIR before or during the 
war-gaming process. Knowing what is needed to know to win is a must if war- 
gaming is to determine the efficacy of a particular COA for accomplishing the 
commander's intent. 
E. STEPS 5, 6, AND 7 OF THE MDMP 
COA Comparison, Approval, and Orders Production are as important to 
successful LIC/SSC operations as they are to any other type of military 
operation, but no more so. Therefore, there is little reason to review these steps 
here. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has used the MDMP as a framework to discuss specific 
points and areas that we feel require either special, or different, emphases when 
planning for LIC/SSC versus more conventional operations. It is our view that if 
the areas we emphasized are addressed in sufficient detail, the necessary 
conditions will have been set to begin effective planning for LIC/SSC operations. 
36 
IV. SOMALIA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The scope of this chapter is limited to understanding the United States' 
decision to support and execute a counter-leadership targeting (CLT) operation 
against Mohammed, Farrah Aidid as part of the execution of the overall mission in 
Somalia. Using the MDMP as the framework, we will demonstrate that the failure 
to understand the Somali social structure, and Somalia's historical development, 
left planners with a flawed baseline knowledge of the operational environment, 
subsequently leading to a flawed execution strategy. By applying the information 
that was available at the time into the appropriate areas of the MDMP, we will 
point to the flaw in the United States' strategy, which should have been apparent 
at the outset of planning. 
B. STEP 1 OF THE MDMP: RECEIPT OF MISSION 
We are using "Step 1 of the MDMP: Receipt of Mission" as a vehicle to 
explain what US foreign policy objectives were in Somalia and to provide a 
"baseline" of the situation as it existed as the United States became involved in 
Somalia. 
In his book Mars Unmasked, Sean Edwards succinctly sums up the UN 
position in Somalia as: 
...a massive international relief operation that ultimately sought to 
create a stable environment for the Somali people and address the 
underlying political and economic causes behind the famine 
devastating the country. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
backed a UN resolution that created UNOSOM and expanded the 
UN's mission from a humanitarian relief operation to a nation- 
building operation that included disarming the population. (2000, 
pp. 11,12) 
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When looking at the mission statement above, several words and phrases need 
to be defined. First is famine. Famine properly defined is a shortage of food 
brought about by a lack of distribution and, as such, is man-made. Food was 
available in Somalia prior to and during the intervention, but was controlled by 
the dominant clan, of which Mohammed Farrah Aideed was a leader. In Somalia 
historically the clans that controlled the government wielded considerable control 
over the distribution of food during droughts, wars, and other crisis periods 
(Simons, 2001). 
Thus, the phrases "sought to create a stable environment" and "address 
the underlying political and economic causes behind the famine" are highly 
instructive as to what the United States military was going to have to do to alter 
the situation. "Createfing] a stable environment" does not mean simply removing 
those clans in power, but completely revamping Somali culture.   Somalia has 
never had a "stable environment" if, by this, we mean a working government of 
and for the  people.     Somalia  has,  rather,  always  been defined  by clan 
factionalism, thus precluding the very "stable environment" sought by then UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.  An effort to "address the underlying 
political and economic causes behind the famine", therefore, should have been 
one that took into account the Somali culture, and that worked within it to 
produce the changes sought.   Any other approach would predictably lead to 
failure - in the long term, if not immediately. 
This said, it becomes obvious that any plan to disarm the population would 
be met with various shades of organized resistance for three reasons. First, in a 
38 
country with most of the population still nomadic, individuals needed weapons to 
protect their herds. Second, a civil war was being fought in the north before Siad 
Barre was threatened in the capital, leading to an overall climate of insecurity 
(Simons, 2001). Third, any move to disarm the population would meet with 
resistance not only from the clans currently in power, but all clans - since any 
power vacuum left by deposed clans would be filled by other clans; it would have 
been in the interest of all clans to maintain their weapons for that eventuality. 
The United States' failure to see and understand the situation in Somalia 
through the eyes of Somalis was the predominant reason we pursued a flawed 
CLT strategy against Aidid. Seeing Somalia through the eyes of Somalis is a 
confusing and complex task, particularly since Somalis themselves were so 
factionalized. Furthermore, seeing Somalia through the eyes of a Somali is 
impossible without engaging in a historical or cultural analysis. Yet nothing 
should have been more important given the United States' CLT operation against 
Aidid (August - October 1993). CLT strategy must account for the future. The 
removal of a leader may - or may not - lead to conflict resolution. But removing 
the leader is rarely, if ever, "the end of the story". For the United States to fully 
appreciate what its CLT strategy against Aidid could or could not accomplish, the 
United States should have had a clear vision of what was required afferthe CLT, 
and more importantly, what, if any, responsibilities the United States had 
regarding closure or conflict termination in Somalia. 
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1.       Understanding   the   United   States'   Somali   Foreign   Policy 
Objectives 
In 1991 the central government of Somalia collapsed when its dictator, 
Siyad Barre was forced out of the country. With Siyad Barre out of the country, 
the Somali clans that overthrew Barre struggled ineffectively to gain control of the 
country.   In 1992 the warring clans signed a cease-fire, and the United Nations 
implemented Operation Provide Relief - United Nations Operations in Somalia 
(UNOSOM i;, a humanitarian relief effort to provide food and support to the 
Somali people. Clan warfare and civil strife rapidly eroded UNOSOM I's ability to 
disperse aid to the Somali people, and within four months the United States 
initiated Operation Restore Hope to provide armed security for the humanitarian 
effort.   During an address to the nation on December 4, 1992, President Bush 
described the objective of Operation Restore Hope thusly: 
Our mission has a limited objective- - to open the supply routes, to 
get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN 
peacekeeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open- 
ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary. 
(Carpenter, 1992) 
President Bush further stated that the United States had no intentions of 
"dictating] political outcomes" in Somalia.    The United States' foreign policy 
objectives were clearly limited to providing humanitarian assistance. 
In January 1993, the United States passed responsibility back to the 
United Nations, and UNOSOM II began.   Although the United States passed 
responsibility to the United Nations with UNOSOM II, the United States did not 
withdraw all of its troops. The objective of UNOSOM II was peace enforcement 
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and nation building, as opposed to Operation Restore Hope's humanitarian 
objective.  Admiral (Ret) Howe, the Special Representative to the UN Secretary 
General described the manner in which UN Resolution 814: 
...really changed the mandate for the United Nations or for any 
force that was there from a pure humanitarian effort to one that 
looked to how the country would be left, basically to put it back on 
its feet, to help it economically, to help it politically to become a 
representative government.... (Frontline, 1998) 
While the American public, and perhaps members of the government, believed 
the United States still had humanitarian objectives it claimed for Operation 
Restore Hope, by default the objectives were now more force-oriented, as peace 
enforcement entailed the "Application of military force, or threat of its use, 
normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with 
resolutions..." (FM 101-5-1, 1997, p. 1-119). 
UNOSOM II began on a positive note.   The Addis Ababa Accords, a 
resolution by the Somali political faction leaders to end the violence, were signed. 
But the peace was short lived.   Fighting erupted again in Mogadishu, but the 
preponderance of the fighting this time was not between Somali factions. 
Instead, it was between the UN and Aidid's faction. Tensions rose between the 
UN and Aidid, as Aidid felt the UN was favoring his rival, Ali Mahdi, to lead the 
UN  sponsored  provisional  government  in  Somalia.  Tensions  erupted  into 
violence on June 5, 1993, when UN Pakistani peacekeepers inspected one of 
Aidid's weapons caches.   As the Pakistanis left the cache site, Aidid's militia 
ambushed and killed 24 of the Pakistani soldiers.    Days later, six Somalis 
employed by the United Nations were brutally murdered by individuals who 
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appeared to be members of Aidid's militia, causing the UN to offer a $25,000 
reward for information leading to Aidid's apprehension. 
On July 12, 1993, the UN responded to Aidid's acts of violence by 
attacking the Abdi House, a suspected command and control center for Aidid's 
faction. Led by American Cobra helicopters, the UN attack on the Abdi House 
was executed as clan elders, intellectuals, and militia leaders were meeting. The 
Cobras fired TOW missiles into the house, devastating it and killing many of the 
occupants. However, Aidid was not among them. After this attack, members of 
Aidid's faction believed - if they had not already - that they were at war with the 
United States. From Aidid's point of view it was clear that the United States was 
now willing to do far more than just provide a reward for his capture. 
After ten American soldiers were killed by mechanical ambushes in 
August 1993, Task Force (TF) Ranger deployed to Somalia. Aidid and the 
Somali people clearly interpreted TF Ranger's mission as a deliberate CLT 
operation, planned and executed by the United States with the sole aim of 
apprehending Aidid. 
Both the chronology and the foreign policy objectives of the United States 
and the UN clearly demonstrate why the United States conducted a strategic 
special operation, CLT strategy against Aidid. By default, the United States 
assumed the UN's peace enforcement and nation building objectives after control 
passed to the UN for UNSOM II. As a member nation of UNSOM II, the United 
States played a role in leading Aidid to believe that he would be "left out" of the 
new Somali government. As tensions with Aidid turned to fighting and the United 
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States took a leading role in the Abdi house attack, Aidid became convinced that 
the United States was the principal agent in "freezing him out" of the new Somali 
government. After the attack on the Abdi House failed, the conventional force 
structure in Somalia had virtually no chance of capturing him. Consequently, the 
United States had two options: to either not support the UN's CLT strategy to 
apprehend Aidid, or to provide the force structure necessary to accomplish the 
mission. Sending additional conventional forces to Somalia, while already 
withdrawing troops from Operation Restore Hope, would have contradicted the 
United States' policy. The solution was TF Ranger, a small, extremely capable 
force, specifically trained to conduct the type of CLT operation required to 
apprehend Aidid. With Aidid captured, the United States believed that the major 
obstacle to nation building would no longer be an issue - an assumption, as we 
shall see, that proved incorrect. 
C.       STEP 2 OF THE MDMP: MISSION ANALYSIS 
We discussed several sub-steps of "Step 2 of the MDMP: Mission 
Analysis" in Chapter 3. While the IPB provides a suitable framework for 
highlighting the areas that planners need to address prior to contemplating any 
strategy, our discussion here will focus on the baseline information the Somali 
planners needed to have - and needed to understand - regarding the Somali 
social structure before planning a CLT operation against Aidid. 
1. Step 1 of the IPB: Define the Battlefield Environment 
To define the battlefield environment adequately, planners needed to 
understand the relevant aspects of Somali history and culture, which should have 
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served as indicators against pursuing a CLT strategy against Aidid. To 
determine these indicators, analysis of Somali social structure and overall history 
are necessary. 
a.        The Relevant Aspects of Somali Social Structure 
Planners may have felt analysis of "traditional Somali society was 
irrelevant for determining the validity of a CLT strategy against Aidid.  However, 
as Abdalle Omar Mansur (1995), a Somali intellectual, points out: 
The most serious problem in Somalia today is that our cultural 
traditions are not compatible with the construct of a modern state. 
We Somalis are prisoners of a culture that we had created in the 
past and one which we refuse to reexamine... we must reinvent 
ourselves and in the process launch the construction of a new, 
viable state. (Mansur, p. 16) 
Mansur's statement does much to explain why the United States' CLT strategy 
against Aidid was based on faulty logic. 
Somalia's pastoral nomadic heritage is the culture Mansur refers to 
as holding Somalis "prisoners" to the past. Subsisting as livestock herders, 
pastoral nomads typically live in fluid, mobile groups. They must frequently move 
in order for their herds to graze. A mobile culture is less apt to develop a society 
with permanent and formal governing institutions. However, it is inaccurate to 
say nomadic pastoralists do not have a social structure governing their relations. 
In fact, Somalis are hardly the only people who, having developed 
as pastoral nomads, retain a social structure whose building blocks are clans 
(Simons, 2001). As Luling (1997) notes, the clan system is "a system of groups 
linked genealogically by descent through the male line, both dividing and uniting 
the Somali nation" (p. 289). The clan system provides the nomadic pastoralists 
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with a flexible social structure, perfectly suited to their mobile lifestyle.   On the 
face of it, the clan system seems simple enough, but consider the potential size 
of a given clan after several hundred years. At some point all clans split, giving 
rise to sub-clans that may not remain contiguous within the parent clan, but still 
share common blood lines.   In the past, lineage, sub-clan, and clan fissures 
allowed people to engage in hostilities or alliances situationally.  Simons (1997) 
describes this concept stating that 
...genealogies record links which are kept only if kin prove worth 
remaining tied to: if they are reliable, helpful, and don't cause strife 
within the group. What genealogies really represent, then, are 
charts of trustworthiness, according to which connected individuals 
can presume that, based on past relations among their forbears, 
they should get along. Gaps, meanwhile, (which can be small 
between lineages or gulf-like among clan-families) reflect people 
not having gotten along, which then offers a historical precedent for 
not having to get along now or in the future, (p. 16) 
Nomadic pastoralists traditionally do not bond into large structured 
organizations. However, it is inaccurate to contend that pastoral nomads cannot 
bond into large organizations if either the requirement (security), or the desire 
(plunder) is present to do so.   Historically, pastoral nomads united only when 
threatened by others.  Because most Somalis were always surrounded by other 
pastoral nomads they rarely needed to stay united for long. Alternately, pastoral 
nomadic groups that could target wealthy, sedentary populations often attained a 
level of cohesion Somalis never knew.   The concept of "supply and demand" 
explains this phenomenon.   Sedentary and more structured societies typically 
had commodities people in the pastoral nomadic societies could not produce, or 
did not have.   The Mongols, epitomize perhaps the most famous as well as 
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successful, examples of a pastoral nomadic group that habitually plundered 
others. As Thomas Barfield notes, it was not Chinggis Khan's intent to conquer 
his neighboring states, but to unite the various Mongolian nomadic tribes in order 
to plunder the states bordering Mongolia (1994, p. 175). 
It is worth noting that Mongol leaders following Chinggis Khan 
adopted the strategy of extorting tribute from the states the Mongols defeated 
militarily. Although the Mongols never proved themselves adept administrators 
of a formal state, once exposed to the concept of a formal state, they modified 
their strategy to better satisfy their desires. 
Gaining a conceptual understanding of the principles underlying 
pastoral nomadic societies, and discussing the exploits of the Mongols may 
seem irrelevant to understanding why the United States CLT strategy against 
Aidid was flawed. However, these aspects of pastoral nomadic culture are 
relevant to understanding the more recent trends in Somali society. 
b.       Setting the Stage - Independent and Post Cold War 
Somalia 
Somalia gained its independence and was first established as a 
sovereign state in 1960. After a nine year attempt to establish a parliamentary 
democracy, Siyad Barre took over Somalia and maintained control of the country 
until his ouster in 1991 (Luling, 1997, p. 290). During his twenty-two years of 
dictatorial rule, Siyad Barre attempted to overtly suppress clannism, while 
covertly relying heavily on clan practices to maintain his position. Cabdullaahi 
Dool (1995) affirms this when he explains that during Siyad Barre's rule 
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All public use of clan names was forbidden; yet all the while Siyad 
Barre was practicing 'clan clientelism', distributing arms and money 
to his friends, 'encouraging them to attack the common clan 
enemies who, of course, were accused of divisive "tribalism" by the 
master tribalist.... (p. 32) 
By relying on "clan clientelism", the structures of a formal state, as an American 
would see and understand these, were never sufficiently developed. 
While Somalia became a "sovereign" state in 1960, in reality 
Somalia's colonial period only ended with the end of the Cold War. During the 
Cold War, newly formed African countries became a prime battleground for the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as both countries attempted to gain 
dominance in the region. The Soviets and the Americans exported economic aid 
and weapons to maintain the newly formed African countries under their 
influence. As was the case with people in many of the other newly formed 
African countries, Somalis were largely indifferent to American or Soviet 
ideology. However, the economic aid and weapons they could wrest from either 
the United States or the USSR were extremely welcome, and were principal 
agents for Siyad Barre maintaining power in Somalia. 
The outside resources provided to Siyad Barre's government and 
clan allowed Somalia to continue much as it had during the colonial period. 
Commodities, which Somalia did not (and still does not) have the industrial base 
to produce, were provided by outside sources. Somalia remained remarkably 
stable under this rubric for twenty-two years, despite fighting a war in 1977-78 
and switching its superpower allegiances from the Soviet Union to the United 
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States.   But when the Cold War ended, the outside aid that lent Siyad Barre 
"artificial legitimacy" also ended, and clan rivalries erupted into civil war. 
2.       Step 2 of the IPB: Describe the Battlefield's Effects 
An understanding of the historical development of Somali society should 
have been considered necessary before planners could hope to understand the 
significance of the battlefield environment and its effects on the operation at 
hand. This section will demonstrate that a better understanding of the battlefield 
environment could have led planners to a different understanding of the 
battlefield effects as they relate to the CLT strategy. This section centers on the 
significance of resource control as it applied to the power struggle already taking 
place between the clans as the United States prepared to enter the fray. 
Somalia, and Mogadishu in particular, were in ruins as a result of the inter- 
clan warfare in the early 1990s. Any semblance of a formal government and 
government institutions and agencies were absent. The civil servants running 
these agencies under Siyad Barre's government either escaped Somalia, as did 
Siyad Barre, or were murdered, or were in hiding. The prospect of the situation 
getting better anytime in the foreseeable future was grim. As Compagnon (1998) 
notes regarding a pastoral society: 
...a feud would only temporarily mobilize the men of a clan for 
military service, after which they would resume their pastoral 
activities, and because the insurgent force had been mobilized in 
much the same fashion as a traditional raiding party, it was wrongly 
assumed that young armed pastoralists would return to the bush 
after final victory, (p. 78-79) 
The scene in Mogadishu was one of armed clans, temporarily out of work, but 
anticipating returning to work in the near future. As Compagnon describes it, the 
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clan-based militias remained in Mogadishu to ensure that their political faction 
would be present to establish a position in the new Somali government, when 
this was created (p. 79). 
The dynamics of political factionalism is a complex concept, but must be 
understood  in order to comprehend the setting  in Somalia.     Compagnon 
describes political factionalism: 
... based on clans because - as a legacy of Siyad Barre's regime, 
as much as a constraint of traditional pastoral society - a fighting 
force can be recruited only through clan affiliation. Any political 
entrepreneur will look first to his own lineage to build support, 
whether for electoral competition as in the 1960's during the 
parliamentary regime, or for military competition as in the 1990's. 
But these political entrepreneurs are not parochial clan chiefs or 
pastoral elders. They are ambitious modern politicians, former 
army officers, civil servants, members of parliament, merchants or 
university professors, who have quickly adapted to the new rules of 
the game of competition for power, (p. 83) 
In short, the political factions existed only as extensions of the clan(s) they 
represented.   The larger and more cohesive the clan, the stronger the political 
faction could become.   It must be remembered that clans and their lineages 
would become more cohesive when members believed it in their best interests to 
join forces 
What was at stake for Somalis was control of the government, an abstract 
concept that the average Somali probably did not care about and was not 
interested in involving himself with.   Rather, it was the more important - and 
immediate - issue of controlling the wealth and commodity goods presently 
streaming into the country during UNISOM II that the average Somali could 
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conceptualize and was concerned with. The conditions in Somalia were ripe for 
clan factionalism, as Luling (1997) notes: 
Clans had always competed for resources such as land, grazing 
and water, but now that control of all these resources and much 
more was vested in the state, competition between clans, which 
before had been only one aspect of their existence, became its 
permanent condition. The state was both the arena within which 
they fought and the prize for which they contended, (p. 290) 
Compagnon's statement, "...these political entrepreneurs are not 
parochial clan chiefs or pastoral elders...[but] are ambitious modern politicians", 
requires amplification in light of Luling's statement (Compagnon, 1998, p. 83). 
Political entrepreneurs had to gain support from the clan leadership. 
Compagnon further states that: 
...[political] entrepreneurs - who are not absolute monarchs, but 
are certainly more than chief executive officers - have to bargain 
with their various stake holders, such as intellectuals, elders, 
financiers, militia commanders, and even women's groups. (1998 
p. 83) 
There are two critical points here the United States should have established, but 
did not, as indicators which would have steered it away from pursuing a CLT 
strategy against Aidid. First, that Aidid's political faction was not an organization 
with a rigid command and control structure, and, second, that Aidid was in the 
process of solidifying his position in the political faction before the United States 
engaged in CLT operations against him. 
Every CLT strategy must consider who is likely - and who should - 
replace the target if he is effectively removed from the organization or the scene. 
In Somalia, there were numerous political entrepreneurs vying for control of the 
Somali state, but Aidid's principal opponent was Ali Mahdi Mohamed.    Mahdi 
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and Aidid were both ambitious individuals who attempted to gain power in 
Somalia during the waning days of Siyad Barre's regime, and both Mahdi and 
Aidid were jailed at various times by Siyad Barre. Although Mahdi and Aidid 
shared some similarities - namely, their political ambition - their differences were 
more significant, as Compagnon notes "...there was a clash not only of ambitions 
but also of ethos, between the professional and authoritarian military elite [Aidid] 
and the new merchant bourgeois [Mahdi]" (1998, p. 84). 
The critical event leading to Aidid's and Mahdi's competition for power, 
which indirectly led to the CLT strategy against Aidid, was Mahdi's appointment 
"...as interim president on 28 January 1991, without consulting Aidid, who was 
still out of the capital" (p. 81). Compagnon goes on to note that the international 
community supported Mahdi's appointment as the interim president (p. 81). The 
international community's support of Mahdi probably worked to his disadvantage 
as he attempted to coalesce the requisite clan support for his cause. Simons 
describes the Somalis as eager to accept western commodity goods and material 
luxuries, but extremely resistant to western intervention into Somali internal 
affairs and traditions (1997, p. 17). Consequently, in June 1991, when Aidid was 
elected chairman of the previously fragmented United Somali Congress (the 
clan-based political faction controlling Mogadishu), his next step was to use a 
military solution to solidify his position in Mogadishu at Ali Mahdi's expense - all 
in the name of accessing resources - and Mogadishu remained in varying states 
of civil war until Operation Restore Hope provided stability on December 9,1992. 
51 
Taken as a whole, the cumulative effects of Somali culture, the United 
States' foreign policy objectives, and the setting in Somalia during the period 
leading up to October 1993 clearly demonstrates that the removal of Aidid was in 
no way, shape, or form a "coup de main" for successful nation building in 
Somalia. 
3.       Step 3 of the IPB: Evaluate the Threat 
We noted in the preceding section that Aidid's political faction was not an 
organization with a rigid command and control structure, and that Aidid was in 
the process of solidifying his position in the political faction before, during, and 
after the United States' CLT operations against him. When planners "Evaluate 
the Threat", one of the questions that must be answered is, "What are the 
consequences that may follow as a result of action taken?" To answer this, 
planners must accurately assess and evaluate the threat's capabilities. As we 
noted earlier, an adversary in LIC/SSC will use his traditional organizational and 
operating procedures to compensate for his conventional military shortcomings. 
Not surprisingly, this is exactly what we see in the aftermath of the attack on the 
Abdi House. 
As discussed previously, an underlying objective for clan based political 
factions was the control of commodities flowing into Somalia. Gaining control of 
the state was a means to an end in this endeavor. Prior to outside intervention, 
Aidid's political faction increased and legitimized its support base vis a vis other 
clan competitors in Somalia. After Operation Restore Hope, the United States' 
actions had the unintended effect of further solidifying Aidid's clan-based political 
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faction, particularly with the raid on the Abdi House. As noted previously, the 
occupants of the Abdi House were clan leaders, intellectuals, financiers, and 
religious leaders - put simply, the occupants of the Abdi House were the people 
directly responsible for Aidid's political support. The fact that they were being 
targeted by the United States for apparent liquidation only enhanced their 
importance and proved their point to potential supporters: the United States was 
interfering unfairly in domestic Somali politics. More to the point still, by targeting 
Aidid at all the United States ignored his faction's concerns and grievances. In 
other words, while leadership may be a factor in obtaining coalition support, 
removing the leadership from the coalition does not negate the perceived need 
for the coalition's existence. 
4.       Step 4 of the IPB: Determine Threat COAs 
The threat COA's that logically follow from any thoughtful analysis 
conducted in Steps 1 through 3 of the MDMP - irrespective of any friendly COA's 
that may have potentially been considered - directly preclude consideration of a 
CLT strategy as a means to accomplish the stated mission in Somalia. The 
information provided and analyzed in previous sections was available to the 
United States foreign policy decision-makers when the CLT strategy against 
Aidid was developed and pursued. Had this information been properly analyzed, 
policy makers could not have drawn the conclusions they did regarding a 
successful CLT operation against Aidid. 
To briefly recap, the United States CLT strategy drew invalid conclusions 
regarding the effects of a successful CLT operation against Aidid, and failed to 
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identify tasks required after the operation (had it succeeded) to facilitate 
successful nation building in Somalia. The vision of a CLT strategy cannot end 
with the successful apprehension or removal of a target. A CLT strategy by its 
nature intends to change or alter the future of an organization or society by 
removing a leader. The analysis conducted in the previous sections about 
Somalia's past, and the conditions present at the time of the CLT operation, 
demonstrates why the CLT strategy was flawed. Admiral (Ret) Howe averred 
that the United States' foreign policy objective was congruent with UN resolution 
814 (nation building - the mission) in Somalia, and that the apprehension of Aidid 
(the method) was an action considered necessary to facilitate successful nation 
building in Somalia. But, in light of what we know of the battlefield environment 
and effects, he was completely wrong. 
The Somali clan-based political factions were akin to coalitions. 
Removing the leadership of a political faction does not change common interests 
and objectives. The only way to change common interests in Somalia would 
have been to change the conditions in Somalia that allowed these interests to 
prevail. To reinforce the point: if Iraq had executed a successful CLT operation 
against General Schwarzkopf during Desert Storm, the dissipation of the "Gulf 
War Coalition" would have been a highly unlikely consequence. The "Gulf War 
Coalition" would have maintained its integrity due to common interests and 
objectives. The same logic applies to Aidid's political faction. The United States 
lacked foresight in believing Aidid's apprehension was a "coup de main" for 
successful nation building in Somalia. 
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Had the United States policy makers fully understood the infrastructure of 
the Somali clan-based political factions - by correctly analyzing the information 
available - the CLT strategy against Aidid would not have been pursued. Aidid 
was not an integral component to the functioning of his political faction.  In fact, 
Aidid's position was tenuous - a position which Aidid could have easily lost 
without outside assistance or interference.  Granted, had Aidid been removed a 
power struggle would have ensued, but Aidid was "replaceable".   Compagnon 
reinforces this point as he describes the clan factionalism after the United States 
had terminated its CLT strategy against Aidid: 
...Usman Ato, who was once described as Aidid's most trusted 
lieutenant and supplied his money and weapons, broke away from 
Aidid in 1994 to form his own militia, and later fought fiercely 
against the group led by Aidid's son Huseen. (1998, p. 84) 
This example, perhaps best of all, succinctly sums up just how deep the flaws in 
the United States' understanding of all things Somali were. The clan factionalism 
evidenced here was not a new phenomenon brought about in recent times - it 
was "business as usual". In light of this fact, the capture of Ato by TF Ranger as 
an attempt by the United States to severely degrade the functioning of Aidid's 
political faction is particularly ironic. 
55 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
56 
V. HAITI CASE STUDY 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the Somalia operation, the Clinton administration published 
the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) White Paper entitled "The 
Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" in 
May, 1994, in an effort to codify the circumstances under which the United States 
would engage in military intervention. Of the "six major issues of reform and 
improvement" that PDD-25 addresses, the first, significantly, is "Making 
disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support..." 
(1994). In addressing this issue, the PDD outlines twenty-one separate factors 
that the Administration will consider "when deciding whether to vote for a 
proposed new UN peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII) or to support a 
regionally-sponsored peace operation" (1994). 
PDD 25 addresses one part of a two-part problem inherent to LIC/SSC 
operations by giving policy makers a touchstone to determine when to engage in 
an operation, under what circumstances, and with what degree of support (both 
public and congressional). PDD 25 does not address the second part of the 
problem, which is how to engage in an operation. To answer this question we 
return to the most fundamental step, mission analysis. 
In those areas where the mission in Haiti could have been more 
successful, the reasons that it was not can be process-traced directly back to a 
flaw in the mission analysis. Failings or shortcomings in Haiti were not a result of 
faulty execution on the part of the units or agencies on the ground - the units and 
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agencies conducted the missions as they were given them with alacrity. Any 
shortcomings manifested in the actions of units are instead a direct reflection of 
the mission analysis conducted. 
Operation Uphold Democracy was unique in that three OPLANs and one 
fragmentary order (FRAGO) were developed for its execution; each focused on a 
distinctly different environment.    On one end of the spectrum, OPLAN 2370 
called for the invasion of Haiti with overwhelming force provided by a JTF 
centered around the XVIII Airborne Corps in a forced entry operation that would 
wrest control of the country. Planning for this eventuality began in October, 1993 
and development and refinement continued for the next nine months.   At the 
other end of what was, at the time, the conceivable spectrum of the environment, 
OPLAN 2380 called for a permissive entry of a 10th Mountain Division TF; and at 
the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), planning for this contingency 
began in May. 1994.    Development of an OPLAN which split the difference 
between the two - OPLAN 2375 - began on September 2, 1994, envisioning a 
forced entry by the XVIII Airborne Corps, with a subsequent permissive entry by 
the 10th Mountain Division.   The final OPLAN, and the one actually executed, 
was "OPLAN 2380 Plus" - a hybrid developed from the first three.  Planning for 
this OPLAN (officially known as JTF 180 Fragmentary Order 35) began at 2200 
hours on September 18: 
[General] Shelton approved the 2380 Plus concept at 0100 in the 
morning on September 19, and by 0300, an OPORD had been 
issued to the appropriate forces for mission accomplishment. Just 
after 0900...U.S. Army forces arrived in Haiti via Blackhawk 
helicopters. (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 104) 
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While each of these OPLANs involved different methodology, the 
commander's intent with regard to Haiti (read the NCA), remained the same. 
This is an important factor to keep in mind while examining the execution of the 
overall mission by various units. 
Just as actions speak louder than words, the actions of various units tell a 
great deal about the restated mission actually derived by the commanders and 
planning staff of those units. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to two 
areas. First, we will examine in narrative form portions of the strategic level 
planning process for Haiti, covering information derived in the steps of mission 
analysis commonly referred to as the "mission factors": mission, concept of 
operation, intent, and specified and implied tasks. The discussion will bring to 
light examples of the fallout that can occur when military planning does not take 
into account follow-on efforts. Second, we will briefly address the strategic level 
mission analysis, and use this as a springboard to address three points. First, 
that MG Meade, the 10th Mountain Division's commander, did understand the 
intent of the mission. Second, that MG Meade ignored the intent in his 
execution. Third, the negative repercussions and fallout that can occur when 
execution is at cross purposes with intent. 
B.       THE STRATEGIC LEVEL PLANNING PROCESS 
Prior to the receipt of the mission outlined in UN Security Council 
Resolution 940 in July, 1994, the United States began the development of two 
separate OPLANs in anticipation of United States involvement in Haiti - as 
discussed earlier, the first was devoted to a forced-entry response, the second 
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based on a permissive entry.   It is the second one, OPLAN 2380, that we are 
interested in here. 
The planners developing OPLAN 2380 recognized the need for a high 
degree of interagency cooperation and parallel planning given the permissive 
environment under which the OPLAN would be launched. Essentially, being 
relieved of the requirement to "fight their way in" before restoring Aristide to 
power, the units and agencies involved under OPLAN 2380 could hit the ground 
running. Planning for this OPLAN, after being conceptualized in the spring of 
1994, began in earnest in late May of 1994. Thus, the United States had two 
developed OPLANs at its disposal upon receipt in July, 1994 of the UN mission. 
The UN intent - essentially the intent two levels up from the USACOM 
planners - was outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 940, and provided for 
a multinational force to: 
Secure the departure of the de facto military regime from Haiti, 
restore the legitimate government to power, and create a secure 
and stable environment that would allow for Haiti's democratic 
political processes to advance and its shattered economy to 
recover. (Oakley, Dziedzic, & Goldberg, 1998, pp. 219-220) 
Based on this intent statement, US Atlantic Command (USACOM) derived the 
following intents: 
• Neutralize armed opposition and create a secure environment for 
restoration of the legitimate government 
• Preserve or restore civil order 
• Be prepared to pass responsibility for military operations in Haiti to 
UNMIH. (p. 220) 
The mission in Haiti then was to reinstate the Aristide government, and to 
set the country up so as to give it the best chance for survival, while at the same 
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time not engaging in "nation building" per se, the latter to remain the purview of 
the UNMIH. 
The United States' objectives that needed to be accomplished to fulfill the 
UN's intent came in two varieties: those as part of United States national security 
objectives in Haiti, and those relating to protection and advancement of United 
States' interests in Haiti (Niblack, 1995, p. 8). Within these two categories, there 
are two tasks in particular that hold special interest: the creation of a "secure and 
stable environment that would allow Haitian people to assume responsibility for 
their country", and the cessation of "widespread human rights abuses" (p. 8) 
(italics the authors'). Based on these two stated objectives, judicial reform and 
law enforcement reform naturally fall out as specified tasks necessary to 
accomplish the mission. 
Toward this goal a US-led multinational force had the first part of the 
overall mission - that of stabilizing the situation and returning Aristide to power - 
to be followed by a United Nations mission in Haiti (UNMIH), with the intent of 
solidifying and building on the gains already made. The overall objective was to 
do it right the first time so that we wouldn't have to do it a second time. Ballard 
lays out quite accurately the planning process as it applied to Haiti; but more . 
importantly, he sets the stage for what the planning process is, and how it works. 
His first two sentences are absolutely correct and were absolutely not followed in 
Haiti: 
Campaigns are composed of a series of major battles or multiple 
military operations over time, all linked to the same strategic or 
operational objective. Campaign planning involves the design and 
arrangement  of these   operations  to  achieve  national policy 
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objectives, normally through the development of one or more 
Operations Plans (OPLANs). (Ballard, 1998, p. 63) (Italics the 
authors') 
Moreover, he continues: 
Campaign plans are intended to provide unified focus and clear 
direction for military operations, and to link those military operations 
to the other elements of national power: diplomacy, economic tools, 
and information management...The first step in the joint planning 
process is mission analysis, the determination of the tasks 
needed for success of the operation as well as any restraints on 
flexibility...Once these specified tasks and any implied tasks are 
analyzed, military planners check to determine what plans already 
exist to support the objectives of the operation and what the 
commander's intentions are as to how the operation should be 
carried out. (Ballard, 1998, p. 64) (italics the authors') 
While General (Ret) Colin Powell addressed the issue of inter-service 
cooperation and coordination through Joint Pub I in 1992 (Ballard, 1998, p.63), 
this issue of cooperation and coordination with civilian and other governmental 
agencies at the operational level has not been similarly addressed. Operational 
Security (OPSEC) is always an .issue to one degree or another, and Haiti was no 
exception - falling on the higher side of the scale: 
Security for the Haiti planning was so tight that only six or seven 
officers in Shalikashvili's Joint Staff in the Pentagon knew the 
details of the plan...This meant that even several key general 
officers, some who were intimately involved in the diplomatic and 
support actions for Haiti, were not informed of the work taking place 
in Norfolk...this restriction...would add significant burdens on those 
few who were informed of the details, because they could not 
leverage the knowledge of all their fellow staff members to 
accomplish their work. (Ballard, 1998, p. 65) 
Security concerns were not without merit, as it turned out. Within days of 
the plan being briefed to the interagency working group (IAW), details appeared 
in the media (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, pp. 93, 94). Security concerns 
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aside, the fact remains that the lack of a connection between the military 
planning and the "diplomatic and support" side of the house effectively shortened 
the planning time available to those involved with missions that took place during 
the military operation and subsequent to it. Essentially, planning had to be 
sequential rather than parallel. With the resulting truncated planning process, 
those involved on the diplomatic and support side had no choice other than to 
focus on the major missions, and give the actual details of those missions short 
shrift. The problem is that the devil is in the details. A prime example of the 
consequences of being forced to engage in this sort of planning surfaced during 
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 1995 conference. Panel members LTG 
Fisher and LTC Lavergne both commented that there was a "conflict between the 
need for civil affairs operations (nation building) and the prescribed military 
mission" (McGrady & Ivancovich, 1998, p. 31). 
The failure to address the "diplomatic and support" aspects prior to entry 
into Haiti complicated matters, since all agencies involved were subsequently 
forced to address them on a crisis management basis. The importance of 
considering "diplomatic and support" issues involved in LIC/SSC missions, and in 
Haiti in particular, in parallel with the operational requirements cannot be 
overstated, since the incidence of "overlap" in LIC/SSC is much greater than in 
any other operation. Permissive and semi-permissive environments lend 
themselves to simultaneous action by civilian, military and other governmental 
agencies, and Haiti is a perfect case in point. Defined as an "overlap in the 
'organizational space"' (McGrady & Smith, 1997, p.11) it forces the military to: 
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...overlap with civilian and interagency bureaucracies and 
organizations. In many operations, the military overlaps other 
organizations, many of which are not designed or oriented to work 
within a military context. This overlap may drive the military 
commander toward developing organization elements, as well a 
operational attitudes, that allow him to work with these other 
elements of the operation. (McGrady & Smith, 1997, p. 11) 
Figure 4, shown below, as taken from Haiti and the Future of Warfare, graphically 
represents the diversity of agencies that played a part in Operation Uphold 
Democracy, and hence were involved in "overlapping battle space", as well as 
"organizational space" (McGrady & Smith, 1998, p. 10). 

















Transportation (Coast Guard) 
Figure 4.   Diversity of Agencies Playing a Part in LIC/SSC  From: Haiti and 
the Future of Warfare 
To conduct this overlap effectively requires that during mission analysis 
the military planner properly identify what other military, civilian, and additional 
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government agencies will likely play a part, based on his assessment of specified 
but mainly implied tasks that will be required to accomplish the mission. If this is 
not done in a timely manner, problems arise that, had they been identified early 
on, could potentially have been handled in stride but now become significant 
issues requiring crisis management. 
Such was the case concerning the need for assistance with both the 
judicial and law enforcement systems in Haiti.  As of October 8, 1994, a week 
before Aristide's scheduled return, the reorganization of the "inner workings" of 
the Haitian government were yet to be complete (Ballard, 1998, p. 123).  Ballard 
phrases the problem diplomatically: 
Normally, the U.S. military could do nothing to help in this effort 
outside of providing personal security for the newly returned Haitian 
leaders; the Department of Justice (DOJ) was the organization that 
had the bulk of the needed expertise, but the DOJ had no readily 
available, deployable personnel to accomplish legal-reform training. 
In the end, U.S. military reservists whose civilian jobs were in 
criminal justice and the law stepped in to form mobile training 
teams to assist in this effort. (1998, p. 123) 
Kretchik et al, on the other hand, sheds more light on the matter and gives it a 
slightly different slant: 
[Major General] Byron... from USACOM J5 went to the National 
Security Council on September 11 to attend the Haiti Interagency 
Working Group as agreed to earlier in the year... At one point, 
Byron turned to the Department of Justice representative to explain 
just how that department was going to train and equip the new 
Haitian police force. The Department of Justice representative 
stated the department could not handle the mission. Byron 
immediately called USACOM, where the mission was given to 
Lieutenant Colonel Phil Idiart, in J5. Idiart spent the next three 
days working at his desk to assemble a plan to create the Interim 
Public Security Force... (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, pp. 
93,94) 
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A final example of truncated planning and execution lies in the training of the 
Haitian police force. During the 1995 CNA conference, Dr. Trouillot, a panel 
member and relative of Ertha Pascal-Trouillot (President of Haiti in 1990), 
commented that it was 
...worth noting that the members of the first graduating class of the 
police academy in 1931 produced every Haitian dictator up until the 
election of Aristide. Also, graduates of the police academy have 
been involved in every military uprising in Haiti since the twenties. 
Haitian history has taught us that this first para-police force, while 
created with the best intentions, resulted in the police-military 
power structure that the most recent intervention sought to replace. 
The question Dr. Trouillot left to session participants is how can we 
reconcile this history with what is being done in Haiti right now 
(McGrady & Smith, 1998, p.34) 
Whether Dr. Trouillot's worries will be borne out remains to be seen, but it 
is worth noting that only two eight-hour blocks of instruction out of the sixteen- 
week course run by ICITAP dealt with producing a "turn of mind" in the Haitian 
police. These courses, "entitled 'Human Dignity' and 'Human Rights", were the 
only ones, "which emphasized the role of law and civil liberties in a democracy" 
(Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 184). 
An additional problem - one that "sandwiches" the planning process and 
further complicates the issues posed by a late planning start - is the placement 
of a fixed end date to the mission which may, or most often may not, reflect 
mission completion. Just as failure to give agencies sufficient time to plan leads 
to either overlooking or being unable to develop in sufficient detail key aspects of 
their own portion of the unified action plan. Placing an artificial "drop dead" date 
on an operation can cause a hurried and, for that reason, inefficient plan which 
may inadvertently either skip, or give short shrift to, key elements of an agency's 
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execution of its portion of the plan. This was the case with ICITAP's program to 
train a Haitian police force, according to ICITAP's Haitian Operations Director, 
Joe Trincellito during an interview with Charles T. Call: 
First we were forced to shorten the planned training from six 
months to four months. Second we had to create a SWAT team in 
Haiti months before we felt they were ready for that kind of training 
and function (Oakley, Dziedzic, &Goldberg, 1998, p.346) 
C.       INTENT VERSUS EXECUTION 
Regardless of the mechanism for entry (forced, semi permissive or 
permissive), associated with the various OPLANs for Haiti, all of the OPLANs 
mirrored the same intent. LTC Bonham, then the XVIII Airborne Corps' chief of 
plans saw the intent as including, "set[ting] the conditions for the re- 
establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti" (Kretchik 1997, p. 62). And 
the 10th Mountain Division saw the intent similarly as one "establishing and 
maintaining a stable and secure environment.... [and to] return President Aristide 
to power" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p.62). 
The execution, however, diverged greatly between what then LTG Shelton 
envisioned and what MG Meade did.  While LTG Shelton repeatedly called for 
MG Meade to extend his presence both within and beyond Port-au-Prince, the 
latter settled into Port-au-Prince in what LTC Anderson of JTF 180 described as 
a "siege mentality" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1997, p. 140).   10th Mountain 
Division soldiers had standing orders to wear full "battle rattle" - Kevlar helmet 
with chinstrap fastened, flak vest, and complete load bearing equipment (LBE) - 
at all times during conduct of their daily duties and were allowed to leave the 
compound only in reinforced platoon sized elements (Shacochis, 1999, p. 218). 
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The contrast between the 10th Mountain Division soldiers under Meade and the 
3rd Special Forces Group (SFG) soldiers in country as part of JTF 180 was as 
striking in mind-set as it was in appearance. In contrast to the soldiers of the 10 
Mountain Division, the 3rd SFG, commanded by COL Boyatt, assumed a 
degraded threat posture (which will be addressed later in the chapter), lived in 
far-flung villages throughout the countryside, and dealt on a personal, one-on- 
one basis with the locals. 
While force protection rightly remains the purview of the commander on 
the ground, the mission still has to be accomplished.   It may be argued that to 
accomplish the commander's intent, which - as agreed to by both LTG Shelton 
and  MG  Meade - was to  "establish  and  maintain  a  stable and  secure 
environment" required at least a rudimentary knowledge of the culture, and at 
least a developing understanding of the personnel within the sector.    This 
requires soldiers to get out among the population to, in LTG Shelton's words, 
"feel the street rhythms" (Kretchik, Baumann, & Fishel, 1998, p. 253).    MG 
Meade's evident policy of non-engagement further separated the command and 
soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division at Port-au-Prince from the population, 
making verification of staff intelligence estimates virtually impossible, and flying in 
the face, as well, of the mission's intent.   "Creating and maintaining a stable 
environment" is different from stabilizing an environment, which better describes 
the actions of the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince. 
MG Meade's tack degraded the effectiveness of civil affairs efforts as well. 
The civil-military operations cell (CMOC) is usually located outside of the 
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supported unit's perimeter for two reasons: the first is so that the security of the 
unit is maintained through not having myriad civilians traipsing about, getting in 
the way, and posing a security risk; the second is to force the civilians to go 
through  a single point of contact for better coordination and to alleviate 
duplication of effort. With the CMOC located within the confines of the Division's 
perimeter in the Light Industrial Complex in Port-au-Prince, the civil affairs team 
had to overcome "friendly" obstacles to do its job.    Kretchik et al, quoted Major 
David le Mauk, then JTF 190's liaison officer (LNO) to the Haitian Police, as 
saying that wearing full battle dress 
. . . gives the wrong impression for the Haitian police because it 
shows that we're not practicing what we preach. I think for the 
population as a whole, that it gives them the impression that they're 
being occupied, and that we are here to oppress, perhaps, rather 
than to relieve them of the burden of Cedras' government. 
Moreover, he added, the threat here, as far as we are concerned, is 
insignificant, and it makes our job harder by having to patrol with 
machine guns and flak vest; it would be better if we could transition 
to a different uniform, I think, for everyone concerned. (Kretchik, 
Baumann, & Fishel, 1998, p. 181) 
In direct contrast to the 10th Mountain Division's mode of operation was 
that of the 3rd SFG.   Working and living among the Haitians, the 3rd SFG was 
able to assess the threat firsthand and, subsequently, the force-protection 
measures needed to minimize that threat.   Shedding the web gear and helmet 
signified two things to the Haitians: trust in the Haitian civilians and military, and a 
degree of self-confidence.    By remaining in the Light Industrial Compound, 
sequestered from the population on a daily basis by distance, fenced enclosures, 
and limited contact, the 10th Mountain Division's understanding of the threat 
posed derived from second hand, sometimes third-hand, reports and estimates 
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from its unit's intel officer. Clearly this did not give the 10th Mountain Division the 
same degree of resolution as the 3rd SFG, as illustrated by Major Robert Shaw 
(1997) in an encounter between members of the 3rd SFG and soldiers from the 
10th Mountain Division. 3rd SFG soldiers working with the Haitian military in their 
area over several days had developed rapport to the point that both sides were 
working to uncover and count weapons caches while wearing T-shirts, with their 
weapons placed aside (p. 38).  During the middle of the operation, conventional 
forces in Kevlar helmets, vests - and openly pointing their weapons at the 
Haitian forces - drove up to the compound where both sides were working. This 
caused the Haitians to "resume the highest level of security" (p. 38), while the 3rd 
SFG soldiers "instantly lost the trust...[they] had worked so hard to obtain" (p. 
39). In a related incident, Shaw writes: 
At one point, a conventional force commander criticized the SOF 
for "being out of uniform," for not conducting what he believed were 
appropriate security measures in the camp and for not applying the 
"appropriate level of force protection." In this case the SOF troops 
did not wear the Kevlar vests because they had lowered the level of 
threat from the FAd'H [Haitian military] at the camp. Clearly, there 
was a different mind-set over the force protection issue (p. 39). 
There are several other incidents that demonstrate vividly the problems 
that may be created by a refusal of a unit to attune itself to the environment in 
which it is operating.  One incident in particular is instructive in the use of blunt 
force, applied with little thought for the ramifications following such actions, and 
bears repeating in its entirety: 
Like the Special Forces, the MPs, supported by civil affairs and 
PSYOP, on the whole dealt effectively with the nuances of working 
in Haiti. Still, there were occasions when coordination with infantry 
of the 10th Mountain Division left much to be desired.   One early iviu ru i ui i i K 
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mishap occurred after MPs and civil affairs soldiers had begun 
working with a FAd'H unit whose barracks adjoined the palace. 
There, the absence of operational boundaries exacerbated 
confusion over responsibilities and missions. Two truck loads of 
infantry from the 10th conducted a raid on a FRAPH compound in 
the same environs and began making arrests. Learning of the 
commotion, members of the FAd'H arrived on the scene. In this 
instance, they were getting out into the streets just as their 
American MP advisers had been encouraging them to do. As they 
did so, however, U.S. infantrymen immediately disarmed and 
arrested them, taped their mouths shut, placed them in handcuffs, 
and hauled them away. Learning of the affair over CNN that 
evening, remaining FAd'H members at the station panicked. Some, 
humiliated and demoralized by the surprising turn of events, burned 
their uniforms in protest. Meanwhile, neighborhood civilians, 
sensing a vacuum of civic order began rioting. (Kretchik, Baumann, 
&Fishel, 1998, pp. 179,180) 
Bob Shacochis places a slightly different slant not only on the way that the FAd'H 
arrived on the scene, but also on the manner of their arrest: 
...they [FAd'H] came roaring up like the Keystone Kops, a dozen of 
them piled onto a Toyota truck. Within seconds, the infantrymen 
had them disarmed too, facedown on the pavement, boots on their 
backs, and rifles at their foolish heads. The cops who didn't take it 
personally were merely handcuffed. The ones who started to 
squawk had gray duct tape wrapped all the way behind their heads 
and back across their lips five or six times. Then the policemen 
were tossed into the back of an army truck and returned to sender, 
stamped with the misery of their enormous humiliation. (1999, p. 
155) 
There are several points that need to be addressed in light of this 
example. First, if the overarching mission in Haiti was to "establish and maintain 
a stable and secure environment" - and it was - then the actions of the 10 
Mountain Division soldiers set back that process. Their actions directly scuttled 
the effectiveness of the FAd'H in that locale, with the result that rioting occurred. 
Is this to say that the actions of the 10th Mountain Division soldiers caused the 
riot? The answer is an unequivocal no: What the manner in which the unit acted 
71 
did was to change the atmosphere such that the population found itself able to 
riot.   Second, the soldiers' actions undermined the credibility of the MPs in the 
eyes of the FAd'H,  making it that much harder for the MPs to gain the 
cooperation of an already skittish FAd'H, and further setting back the time before 
Haitians would be solving Haitian problems.   Third, actions of this type in a 
different society, one in which "saving face" plays a larger role, could well lead to 
the establishment of an undying enmity toward all United States personnel, and 
in some cases it is not unlikely that it could have led to direct use of deadly force 
to "avenge" the wrong. All in all, there are better, more effective ways of dealing 
with similar situations. 
D.       SUMMARY 
The strength of the planning process in Haiti was that it did identify 
properly the intents of the higher headquarters, or key conditions/tasks that 
needed to occur to solve the problem. The weakness in the planning process lay 
in its failure to integrate in a timely manner key organizations that were to play a 
significant role in accomplishing the commander's intent. This resulted from 
multiple military planner's evident failure to understand the time requirements for 
non-military organizations to plan, prepare, and execute. 
There was a failure to synchronize the efforts of the military and non- 
military organizations to accomplish the strategic intent. Various units within the 
military worked at cross-purposes with each other as well: as typified by the MPs 
pushing the FAd'H to deal with Haitian problems, at the same time the 10th 
Mountain Division punished the FAd'H for trying to do so. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT: A THREE-PART SOLUTION 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
One of the biggest problems in LIC/SSC planning, subsequently leading to 
problems with execution, is planners' failure to obtain an adequate "base line" 
understanding of the battlefield environment during Step 1 of the IPB. This 
conclusion is supported in Chapter 3, "The MDMP and Current Doctrine", and 
through case study analysis in the Somalia and Haiti chapters. 
As previously discussed, increased "information management" capabilities 
can provide planners a means of gaining both a better and quicker "base line" 
understanding of the problem, in order to close the "intelligence gap" - by 
providing that information needed to plan a viable COA. Section I of this chapter 
will argue that much of the information planners need to gain a better and quicker 
"base line" understanding of the operational environment is readily available or 
"out there for the taking". Additionally, the section argues that the "availability" of 
information is not necessarily the problem. We feel, instead, that 
"mismanagement" of information and failure to conduct effective communication 
is often the cause for planners not closing the "intelligence gap." Better 
information management, however, is only the first part of what we consider to be 
a three-step solution. 
In Section II we argue for a change in the present military education 
system in order to foster a "synthesis" of current and valid doctrinal ideas for the 
fluid operational environment characterized by LIC/SSC. In Section III we discuss 
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training program modifications we consider necessary to reinforce the modified 
or re-focused education system. 
Because LIC/SSC is the operational environment of the recent past and 
many believe the future, it is only prudent to maximize the resources available to 
us as a military and adjust the way we do business in order to execute missions 
in this environment in the most efficient manner possible. 
B.       SECTION I: INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CAN HELP 
The innovations in information technology within the last ten years have 
revolutionized the "availability" of information. Information technology has 
substantially decreased the amount of time required to obtain information, while 
simultaneously substantially increasing the amount of information available. 
While this holds true for virtually any subject about which one would ever have a 
need to gain information, it is especially true for the type of information military 
planners need to know to increase their understanding of the battlefield 
environment for LIC/SSC operations. This being the case, where then does the 
problem lie? 
Understanding the nature of the problem is the first step in identifying a 
solution for it. As we alluded to in the introduction, the battalion or brigade 
commander on the ground is often executing policy, which essentially means that 
he needs the same level of resolution of intelligence a CINC or JTF would need 
4 
in a more conventional arena.   This is especially so if the battalion or brigade 
commander is expected to effectively "think for himself in the absence of 
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guidance from higher headquarters in the face of unexpected situations. Only 
with the level of resolution normally afforded to a CINC or JTF will the brigade or 
battalion commander be able to, with confidence, make a decision that follows 
the national command strategy while at the same time working within the 
framework of the culture and social structure of the environment in which he finds 
himself. Otherwise, the commander is left to hope that he or she is not acting 
inopportunely in the absence of the information needed to make a sound, 
informed, decision. 
The question then becomes how to become informed? Presently, the 
"system" is highly compartmentalized or "stovepiped." As information flows down 
through the hierarchy, each echelon passes to the subordinate echelon that 
information deemed necessary for the subordinate to know. Who makes the 
decision to pass what information, and whether that decision is right or wrong, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the fact that only selected information flows 
"downhill" remains, and this is unlikely to change. The subordinate is thus left 
with the task of discovering on his own the additional information needed to make 
informed choices in a timely manner. This then leads to the first of two 
interrelated problems: how does a commander know what resources are 
available from which to glean the information needed to "fill in the gaps"? 
Aside from military sources, here are four main categories of sources to 
which he and his staff can, and should, turn: personnel, academic writings, 
popular sources, and native primary sources. The one requirement that all have 
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in common is that they must all be current to be relevant. Anna Simons (2001) 
noted that a perennial problem is that often so-called "experts", who have done 
fieldwork in their country of "expertise", did so many years ago and thus lack up- 
to-date, local information. Experts tend to be regarded as "experts" because they 
are published, tenured professors, etc.  The real experts are often the students 
working on their doctoral dissertations, who are up-to-date on what is going on 
behind the scenes in a given country or region.   The problem is that nobody 
wants to talk to graduate students, because no one yet considers them "expert." 
The same circular logic applies to academic writings.   While historical 
references will certainly be of some use, studies done years ago on a country 
may be of little use in determining present living and economic and political 
conditions.     "Popular"  sources,   meanwhile,   are  those   based  on   personal 
experience of the writer, but are not published in scholarly tomes.   References 
such as the guidebook series published by Lonely Planet, and the Culturearam 
published  by Brigham Young  University are designed to  provide tourists, 
businessmen, and others, useful information about a particular country or people. 
The fourth source - which we are calling "native primary sources" - is the 
writings by people from and in the target country/region writing about themselves 
or their country.  Often, there are newsletters or relevant bulletin boards posted 
on the internet. Taken together as a whole, a range of sources such as this can 
provide the military planner a better snapshot of the situation on the ground in a 
target country or region than would otherwise be gained. 
76 
The second half of the informational problem relates to educating the 
military planner so that he knows the type of information he needs in order to be 
effective in the LIC/SSC environment. Planners at the lower echelons do not 
necessarily have to know enough to come up with the "right" answer on their 
own, but they certainly have to know enough to identify the wrong answer when 
they see it. 
Ultimately, the difference between information and intelligence lies in the 
analysis. There is a lot of information out there, and better information 
management will help, but will not wholly solve the problem. To solve the 
problem, planners must know what types of information are important. Once 
they know that, then the areas in which they must expand their knowledge of the 
battlefield environment will become evident. This said, we think changes to the 
present education system are needed so that planners will be able to look at a 
given situation to determine what information is needed, and then convert that 
information through analysis into intelligence that is pertinent to mission 
accomplishment in a LIC/SSC environment. 
C.       SECTION II: EDUCATION SYSTEM MUST FOSTER SYNTHESIS 
1.       Internalization of Principle: Education versus Spoon Feeding 
The larger problem in military education lies not in what to understand, but 
in applying that understanding. The way doctrine is presently being taught can 
serve as a case in point. Presently, our military education does not always serve 
to develop the student's understanding of the application of doctrine - focusing 
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instead on memorization of terms and ensuring comprehension of doctrinal 
models as an end in and of itself, rather than as the first step toward the ultimate 
goal of the internalization of doctrine and the proper application of its principles. 
By not training and testing students on their ability to synthesize doctrine and 
apply it to new or different situations, military education does not lead students to 
fully understand the desired effects of doctrine. Military education, therefore, 
should focus on three distinct parts: knowledge, application, and synthesis. 
Knowledge is the lowest level of analytical ability. In simple terms, a 
person has knowledge of a subject when he understands the meaning of a 
certain concept. Most military leaders understand the concept of the MDMP and 
possess rudimentary knowledge of problem solving skills. Having knowledge of 
a particular subject, however, does not necessarily mean that a person is 
capable of putting that knowledge to practical use. Application means a military 
leader possesses knowledge of the MDMP and is able to develop logical and 
rational solutions to problems with which he is familiar. Synthesis is 
demonstrated by military planners through the application of both education and 
doctrine to situations with which they are either unfamiliar or inexperienced. We 
feel that requiring students to solve LIC/SSC scenarios using the MDMP is a 
necessary step if military education hopes to prepare its students to be able to 
synthesize its doctrine to new and unique situations. 
There are signs that military education institutions are taking positive steps 
in this direction.   In at least one of the Captain's Career Courses (CCC), the 
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program of instruction (POI) has changed to begin educating students on 
planning and preparing solutions for LIC/SSC operations. The POI changes to 
accomplish this have occurred rapidly, and significant resources have been 
committed to affect the changes. Within eighteen months, this CCC has 
changed its POI from two hours of training on LIC/SSC-related topics to seventy- 
two hours. Whereas this CCC previously did not conduct a LIC/SSC planning 
exercise, it now conducts two LIC/SSC planning exercises. This CCC is now 
encouraging its students to conduct many of the steps of the MDMP during these 
LIC/SSC planning exercises with the same emphasis we espoused in Chapter 3: 
"The MDMP and Present Doctrine". 
Exposing students to these LIC/SSC planning exercises is intended to 
produce a student who is better able to guage what information is required to 
properly understand the battlefield environment during LIC/SSC operations. 
Knowing what type of information is required to understand the LIC/SSC 
battlefield environment is the first step toward enabling planners to better employ 
information technologies to subsequently find this information. 
Part of education is also knowing "yourself." In the LIC/SSC environment 
players include joint forces, SOF, NGOs, and PVOs as well as other 
governmental agencies. All have their own language, culture, customs, modes of 
operation, agendas, etc. In the LIC/SSC arena in particular, to "understand 
yourself means to have at least a working knowledge of these organizations' 
capabilities and limitations, as well as some familiarity with their organizational 
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culture. For instance, even among the services the same phrase may have 
different meanings. There is a joke told that speaks to this with more truth than 
poetry; the essence of the joke is that the phrase "secure a building" to the Army 
means clearing the building of enemy and placing concertina around the 
perimeter, while to the Air Force "secure a building" means obtaining a three-year 
lease with an option to buy. 
Even within the same service different branches have their own ways of 
doing business which are not well understood by sister branches, and 
subsequently lead to confusion, mistrust, and improper utilization. The following 
section addresses some of these differences, using Army SOF as the example. 
After examining how wide the cultural differences are between two branches of 
the same service, it will be easier to understand why inter-service and inter- 
agency coordination is often so difficult, and, more to the point, why it is 
imperative to actively work at understanding those differences in order to 
minimize their effects. 
2. Education of the Conventional Force Regarding SOF 
The Army needs to do a better job of educating its conventional 
commanders beginning at the 0-3 level (when an officer first 'commands' rather 
than 'leads' a unit), regarding the capabilities, limitations, and employment 
strategies of SOF. SOF will continue to play an integral role in every 
engagement, that the US military involves itself in both now and in the 
foreseeable future and in both a tactical and diplomatic sense.   In a 1997 talk 
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marking the  U.S.  Special  Operations Command's tenth anniversary, then- 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted that: 
The employment of SOF overseas rose 35% from FY 1991 to FY 
1992. It rose to 39% from FY 1992 to FY 1993. In FY 1991 SOF 
units and personnel deployed to some 92 different countries of the 
world. In FY 1992 the number increased to 102 countries. By the 
end of FY ,1993 the number had increased to 119 countries 
(Kozarny, 1997). 
Education early on in an officer's career is essential to developing his sense of 
appreciation for forces with which he may never build a habitual relationship, but 
with which he will certainly work at several points during his career.   Through 
exploring several areas at the tactical level where the divergence between SOF 
and conventional forces are most obvious, it quickly becomes apparent that there 
is a need for schooling above that currently offered. 
The biggest drawback that the conventional commander faces is the lack 
of a thorough understanding and appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of 
SOF. Without a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the SOF 
attached to him and without knowing what their training enables them to do, the 
conventional commander is unable to appropriately use them as the combat 
multiplier they are. This inability to maximize SOF use effectively and efficiently 
results in frustration and strained relations on  both sides.     For example, 
commanders are often surprised to discover that the Special Forces medic has 
limited veterinarian capabilities, giving him the ability, among others, to inspect 
meat for consumption (Lopez, 1999).   Something as relatively simple as this 
opens up an entire range of possibilities for the conventional commander in 
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precisely those types of operations in which we find ourselves today - 
humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In areas of the 
world where livestock plays a vital role - two examples being Bosnia and Kosovo 
- this capability properly used can pay huge dividends through an inspection 
program of the local livestock. It can further assist the commander in garnering 
and maintaining popular support by potentially providing a boost to the local 
economy through the purchase of food to supplement United States rations. But, 
again, the ability to utilize this asset is predicated on the conventional 
commander knowing that it is available to him. 
While it is true that this knowledge can be learned 'on the ground', 
learning by trial and error on site is certainly not the preferred method. Having 
the knowledge in advance ensures that there are no opportunities missed 
through ignorance. There is a saying that "when the only tool you have is a 
hammer, every problem looks like a nail." Becoming educated early on about 
SOF gives the conventional commander not only a better-equipped toolbox, but 
one whose tools he understands how to use. 
Another factor negatively affecting the relationship between SOF and 
conventional commanders is a lack of understanding on the part of conventional 
commanders regarding proper employment, capabilities, and limitations of SOF. 
This problem is compounded by the different methodologies conventional and 
SOF units have adopted, affecting not simply units themselves, but units' 
relationships with the host nation military and civilian populations.  Major Robert 
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Shaw (1997) specifically addresses the latter in an article on SOF utilization 
during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. Whether a four man civil affairs 
(CA) team, or a twelve man Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) team, SOF 
units run a better than average chance of being improperly utilized, underutilized, 
or simply not being utilized at all. This doesn't come as a surprise when one 
recognizes that the conventional commander has 'grown up' maneuvering 
squads, platoons, and companies as parts of a larger organization, and in 
conjunction with a larger tactical plan. Trying to fit a four man CA team moving 
freely about the countryside into his schema, as they provide their own security, 
and converse and eat with the local population, is difficult at best. 
A third problem which arises between conventional commanders and SOF 
is the perception that SOF is full of "cowboys", or "loose cannons on deck in 
pitching seas". Several factors contribute to this perception, but foremost 
perhaps are the visual differences. SOF tend to dress differently than 
conventional troops. Frequently their uniforms bear nothing other than their 
name and branch of service, and are termed "clean" uniforms. Often additional 
pockets have been sewn to shirts, and other uniform modifications have been 
made to fill specific needs. Headgear is often a "boonie-hat", patrol cap, or black 
knit cap rather than the standard helmet. These modifications, while anathema 
to many conventional commanders, are often helpful, and in some cases 
necessary, to SOF for accomplishing the mission. Not having rank on a uniform, 
for instance, causes the host nation civilians and military to focus on the person 
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rather than on his rank. This is especially important for the enlisted SOF soldier 
in rank-conscious societies, where identification as an enlisted man drastically 
lessens the team member's effectiveness. 
Group dynamics are also very different among SOF and conventional 
forces, and this dissimilarity is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the use of 
first names between SOF officers and enlisted men serving on the same team, a 
practice simply not done on the conventional side. To many in the conventional 
forces the practice of using first names between superiors and subordinates 
smacks of a lack of discipline. But nothing could be further from the truth. The 
use of first names between team members has little to do with familiarity, and 
more to do with operational security (OPSEC). While traveling in civilian clothes 
the use of first names makes the task of determining whether a person is in the 
military more difficult, something important in areas where the terrorist threat is 
relatively high (as it happens to be in most of the areas SOF are deployed). 
Once in the theater of operations using first names, rather than rank or "sir", 
works in conjunction with a "clean" uniform to signify egalitarianism within the 
team, which again, is important in rank-conscious societies for reasons 
previously mentioned. 
The bottom line is that none of these divergences from conventional 
practices are without purpose; they are not cavalier, nor are they an attempt to 
"go native." More often than not, however, their practical value is not understood 
by conventional commanders, and engenders the erroneous perception that SOF 
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is full of undisciplined individuals, rather than disciplined team players. Gaining 
an understanding and appreciation of the reasons behind these divergent 
practices is critical for conventional commanders at the 0-3 level and beyond, 
since failure to do so can cause potentially deadly situations, as was 
demonstrated in Haiti. 
As currently conceived, the Army's curriculum at the pre-command 
courses does not adequately prepare the conventional commander to maximize 
the use of SOF. To rectify this deficiency, combat-arms officer's advanced 
courses, as well as the battalion and brigade pre-command courses, should 
reassess the SOF portion of their curriculum, and incorporate a SOF NCO as a 
cadre member. The battalion and brigade pre-command courses should 
incorporate a trip to Ft. Bragg for briefings by seated commanders within United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These briefings should 
cover mission profiles with which SOF are presently involved and employment 
philosophies. Additional briefings should come from the Special Forces 
Qualification Course cadre, as well as from the Special Operations Academic 
Facility - specifically its language and cultural studies department. The 
emphasis of these latter briefings should be centered on the methodology the 
cadre employ - not on the end product - so that future conventional 
commanders gain an appreciation for the culture of SOF, as well as for SOF's 
tactical  and technical  abilities.     With the ever-increasing  use of SOF  in 
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conjunction with conventional forces, we can no longer afford to ignore the 
shortcomings of this aspect of our commanders' education. 
D.       SECTION III: TRAINING MUST REINFORCE THE EDUCATION 
Getting the appropriate information into the hands of the decision makers 
and the executors, ensuring decision makers and executors know how to 
integrate the information into the operational setting at hand, and knowing the 
operating capabilities of the units and organizations involved in LIC/SSC, are all 
steps toward improving our efficiency in LIC/SSC operations. But at the same 
time, in order to ensure a marked improvement in the conduct of LIC/SSC 
operations, we must model our training to replicate the complex environments 
normally associated with LIC/SSC operations. 
If training does not reinforce what has been learned through education, 
the findings of inter-agency panels, or organizational re-design regarding the 
conduct of LIC/SSC operations, there is little hope that the efficiency of these 
types of operations will increase in the future. Training is necessary to change 
peoples' beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions. Without training people will soon 
discount any education they have received on the conduct of LIC/SSC 
operations. Additionally, without realistic training, we will not create the 
appropriate systems we need in order to be successful. It is a vicious cycle, 
known all to well to those in the military: people know what needs to happen (in 
this case, often learned the hard way doing real world LIC/SSC operations), but 
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because what is needed is not emphasized through training, the modifications 
required to get better at it are never made. 
LIC/SSC operations present a paradox wherein increasingly lower levels 
of command have the ability to impact strategic success and failure, while these 
same lower levels of command are not being resourced, nor are they provided 
the command authority to impact the LIC/SSC operation in a positive manner. A 
short vignette will help to reinforce and illustrate this point.   During Operation 
Restore Hope, LTC Edward Anderson, then the XVIII Airborne Corps G5, related 
the following problem he encountered as a member of the JTF-180 planning 
staff: 
. .. [we] told them [the ACOM staff] over, and over, and over again, 
it is not our job to do the interagency coordination, please get us 
these answers! And we talked until we were blue in the face - 
identifying requirements; identifying requests for information; 
identifying things that were needed. Answers we had to have. 
(Hayden, 1994, p. 299) 
Moreover, he said: 
By definition, an Army Corps does not have the access to the 
interagency and to the workings of the interagency that the theater . 
CINC must by definition have....XVI11 Airborne Corps does not have 
a political adviser. ICNC USACOM had a political adviser who is, 
oh by the way, a fully qualified ambassador. We don't have 
anything even close to that. The closest thing we have to a political 
adviser, in the XVIII Corps, is the Staff Judge Advocate and the 
G5... (Hayden, 1994, p. 298) 
Here was a corps-level CA officer who knew what to do, knew who he needed 
help from in order to do it, but was unable to "talk" or effectively coordinate and 
87 
work with the people he needed to (in this case the ACOM staff) to get the job 
done. 
What does the above vignette tell us about how we need to structure our 
training so that it replicates some of the issues often associated with LIC/SSC 
operations? 
To begin with, that training must be structured so organizational issues will 
have a direct causal effect on the success or failure of the mission.   This will 
reinforce the significance of gaining the type of understanding that planners must 
obtain during Step 1 of the IPB, Describe the Battlefield Environment.  Second, 
mission success or failure should also correlate to how well CA, interagency, 
SOF, etc., are integrated into the lead unit's "game plan."    If, in a training 
environment, the mission or operation is considered successful, but the "other" 
agencies were not integrated into the plan or execution, then the training 
scenario   nine  times   out  of. ten   did   not   properly  replicate   the   LIC/SSC 
environment.  For example, let us say that a unit in training conducts a textbook 
example of an airfield seizure, but in the process of doing so the unit fails to 
effectively deal with displaced civilians.   In the conventional arena, this might 
pass as a success.   But in the LIC/SSC environment the unit should receive 
failing marks.   Why?   Because in an actual situation these same displaced 
civilians, if not adequately compensated or taken care of, are likely recruits for 
the very insurgency we have been sent to counter. 
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When we create a training environment that mandates that lower level 
commanders must integrate "others" if they want the mission to succeed, the 
problems that currently exist but are otherwise glossed over with regard to 
command and support relationships will be exposed, and therefore can be fixed 
before they have the opportunity to add to the "frictions" of a real world operation. 
Also, after commanders start "losing", and realize they do not have access to the 
resources they need to "win" because they themselves are ignored by their 
higher headquarters (as was the case with LTC Anderson) the "system" will no 
longer be able to skirt the issue of re-examining information flows, and eventually 
we will see a LIC/SSC-appropriate fix. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite what many may think, our doctrine is not only sufficient to enable 
planners and commanders alike to deal effectively with operations in the 
LIC/SSC environment, but the MDMP remains as valid for these sorts of 
operations as it does for the mid to high intensity spectrum of conflict in more 
conventional operations. What we set out to demonstrate in this thesis is that it 
is not the doctrine that has failed us in recent tests (e.g., Haiti and Somalia) but 
that military planners and commanders have failed to properly apply doctrine to 
the situations they found facing them. 
In the Haiti case study, for instance, we saw a subordinate commander 
ignore the intent of his higher, evidently choosing to view mission success as 
having all soldiers in the proper uniform at all times, and doing everything 
possible to prevent any serious incident from occurring during his unit's time in- 
country. In his view, mission success did not include creating a stable 
environment. Rather, he clearly believed that the mere fact of his presence on 
the ground was sufficient to maintain stability in the environment. This mistaken 
view of success was not the fault of "doctrine", nor was it indicative in any way of 
an inability on the part of conventional soldiers to prosecute LIC/SSC missions. 
The blame must, instead, fall on the shoulders of the commander who 
miscalculated during the planning process. 
The Somalia case study offers an even more pointed example of how an 
incorrect assessment of primarily both the battlefield effects and environment led 
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to the flawed notion that a CLT mission against Aidid would go a long way to 
solve what was thought to be the problem in Somalia. Once again, "doctrine" 
was not at fault. As we have demonstrated, had the right information been 
"plugged into" the MDMP and analyzed properly, the MDMP would have provided 
a suitable framework for helping the planners and commanders work toward a 
viable solution for Somalia - or at least they would have understood what not to 
do. 
We thus believe that the solution lies not in changing the tools 
available, but in improving the expertise and judgment of the individuals wielding 
them. Education reinforced by training - beginning early in an officer's career 
and carried on throughout - is key to developing the necessary expertise. We, 
as a military, cannot afford to continue parroting the hackneyed assertion that 
"our job is to fight our country's wars" as though this is sufficient to exclude all 
other missions from our purview. At the time of this writing it is 2001. The United 
States has been involved in numerous operations involving the nation's military in 
some form or capacity in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the ten years 
since Operations Desert Storm, our last conventional conflict. Even in the fifteen 
years, between the end of Vietnam in 1975 and Operation Desert Shield in 1990, 
we engaged in numerous non-conventional operations as well, not the least of 
which was the counter-insurgency (LIC) operation in El Salvador. If the recent 
past or current prognostications are any guide, LIC/SSC operations will likely 
form the largest part of our collective military's missions for the foreseeable 
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future. We, as a professional military and Americans, owe it to ourselves and our 
country to train, plan, and educate accordingly. 
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